




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GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ

(1646-1716)



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The Collected Works of
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ



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Collected Works of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz



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
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
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
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The Works




Leipzig, the most populous city in the German state of Saxony, c. 1804 — Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz' birthplace



Leipzig today



Alte Nikolaischule, the first municipal school in Leipzig, which Leibniz attended for six years



Germany's second oldest university, Leipzig University main building in 1917. It was demolished by the socialist administration in 1968 — Leibniz' father had been a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Leipzig, where he also served as dean of philosophy. In April 1661 Leibniz enrolled here at age 14 and completed his bachelor's degree in Philosophy in December 1662.

System of Theology (1686)



Original Title: 'Systema theologicum'

Translated by Charles William Russell, 1850

Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz was born in Leipzig in 1646. He entered the University of Leipzig as a student of philosophy and law, and in 1666 he obtained the degree of Doctor of Law at Altdorf. The following year he met the diplomat Baron von Boineburg, at whose suggestion he entered the diplomatic service of the Elector of Mainz. During the years of 1672 to 1676, he served as the diplomatic representative of Mainz at the Court of Louis XIV. He also paid a visit to London and made the acquaintance of the learned English mathematicians, scientists and theologians of the day. While at Paris he became acquainted with prominent representatives of Catholicism and was soon interested in the questions that were in dispute between Catholics and Protestants. In 1676 he accepted the position of librarian, archivist and court councillor to the Johann Friedrich, Duke of Brunswick, who was a recent convert to Catholicism.

Almost immediately Leibniz began to exert himself in the cause of reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants. At Paris he had come to know many prominent Jesuits and Oratorians, and at this time he started his celebrated correspondence with Bossuet. With the sanction of the Duke and the approval of Innocent XI, the project to find a basis of agreement between Protestants and Catholics in Hanover was inaugurated. Leibniz soon took the place of Molanus, president of the Hanoverian Consistory, as the representative of the Protestant claims. He tried to reconcile the Catholic principle of authority with the Protestant principle of free enquiry. He favoured a species of syncretic Christianity first proposed at the University of Helmstadt, which adopted for its creed an eclectic formula made up of the dogmas supposed to have been held by the primitive Church. At length, he drew up a statement of Catholic doctrine, entitled "Systema Theologicum", which met the approval not only of Bishop Spinola of Wiener-Neustadt, who conducted the case for the Catholics, but also of the Pope, the Cardinals, the General of the Jesuits, the Master of the Sacred Palace and various others.

Leibniz was actuated as much by patriotic motives as he was by religious reasons. He saw clearly that one of the greatest sources of weakness in the German States was the lack of religious unity and the absence of the spirit of toleration. The role he played was that of a diplomat rather than that of a theologian. However, his correspondence with Bossuet and Pelisson and his acquaintance with many prominent Catholics produced a change in his attitude towards the Church, and, although he adopted for his own creed a kind of eclectic rationalistic Christianity, he ceased in 1696 to attend Protestant services.



Leibniz by Andreas Scheits, Bibliothèque de Hanovre, 1703

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John Frederick by Johann Hulsman, c. 1675 — as Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Frederick ruled over the Principality of Calenberg, a subdivision of the duchy, from 1665 until his death.

SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.



AFTER A LONG and mature examination of the controversies on the subject of religion, in which I have invoked the Divine assistance, and divested myself, as far, perhaps, as is possible for man, of party-feeling, as though I came from a new world, a neophyte unattached to any party, I have at length fixed in my own mind, and, after full consideration, resolved to adopt, the following principles, which, to an unprejudiced man, will appear to carry with them the recommendation of sacred Scripture, of pious antiquity, and even of right reason and the authority of history.

In the first place, then, I believe in the existence of a Most Perfect Substance, one, eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty, which we call GOD; by whom all other things have been created in a most beautiful order, and are preserved by a sort of continual production. The doctrine, therefore, of those who conceive God to be corporeal, finite, circumscribed by place, and ignorant of future contingent events, whether absolute or conditional, is utterly intolerable; and hence I strongly reprobate certain Anti-trinitarians and kindred sectaries, who have not spared even this first principle of faith, and who entertain most unworthy conceptions of God.

Now this Supreme Intelligence created, in order to his own glory, other intellectual beings, whom He governs with most perfect justice; insomuch that any one who could understand the whole order of the Divine economy, would find therein a model of the most perfect form of commonwealth, in which it would be impossible for a philosopher to discover a single want, or to supply any thing in desire.

Hence we must avoid those opinions which represent God as a certain Supreme Power, from which all things, although they emanate, yet emanate indiscriminately, by a kind of necessary existence, and without any selection of the beautiful or the good; as if these notions were arbitrary, or had no foundation in nature, but only in the imagination of men. For God is not only the supreme Creator of all existing things, but He is also the beneficent Prince of all intellectual beings, and in some sense their Legislator; — a Legislator, however, who requires nothing from his subjects but souls actuated by sincere affection, animated with a right intention, persuaded of the beneficence, the consummate justice, the beauty, and goodness, of the most amiable of all lords; and therefore, not merely fearing his power as that of a supreme and all-seeing Monarch, but also confiding in his benevolence, and, in fine, glowing with the love of Him above all things — a sentiment which comprises all the rest.

For those who are impressed with such sentiments, who fix them deeply in their souls, and evince in their lives the sincerity of their convictions, never murmur against the Divine will; being well assured that all things must conduce to the good of those who love God: and, as they are content with the past, so, in what concerns the future, they seek always to act in conformity with that which they presume to be the will of God. Now all that God, in proposing rewards and punishments, requires of each of us, is, that he labour for the fulfilment of his own especial duties; that, like the first man, he cultivate the garden in which he has been placed, and that, in imitation of the divine goodness, he diffuse his beneficence on every object around him, but especially, within the due proportions which justice requires, on all those with whom he may be thrown into intercourse, as being his neighbours; because, among the

creatures which come within our sphere, there is none more excellent than man, none whose perfection is more grateful to God.

If, therefore, all intelligent beings always thought and acted in accordance with these principles, they would unquestionably live happily. But as it is certain that this neither always is, nor has been, the case, a question arises, whence it is that sin, and through sin, misery, entered into the world; for it is clear that God, the author of all good, cannot be the cause of sin. It must be borne in mind, therefore, that in all creatures, however exalted, there is, antecedent to all sin, a certain inborn and original finiteness, which renders them liable to fall; and in this sense is to be understood the sentiment which Job appears to have meant to convey, that not even the holiest angels are free from stain, that is, from imperfection. Nor is this incompatible with the existence of original justice in “God’s image because the rational creature, in so far as it is perfect, derives this perfection from the Divine image; but in so far as it is limited and devoid of certain perfections, so far does it partake of privation, or of nothing. And this is the purport of St. Augustine’s opinion, that the cause of evil arises not from God, but from nothing; that is, not from the positive, but from the privative; — or, in other words, from that finiteness of creatures of which we have already spoken.

And although it would have been possible for God to have created only such intelligences as, though they possessed the power of falling, yet, in point of fact, never would fall, nevertheless it pleased his inscrutable wisdom to create this present order of things, wherein, from among countless others equally possible, certain possible intelligences, which, in the notion of their possibility, or in the idea of them which exists in God, involve a certain series of free actions and divine helps — of faith, charity, eternal happiness, or the contrary — are selected, and admitted to existence, or created: — as, for instance, Adam, who was to be exiled from Paradise; Peter, prince of the apostles, to be a renegade, a confessor, and a martyr; Judas, a traitor, &c. And this, doubtless, because God knew how to convert this partial and particular evil, the occurrence of which He foresaw and permitted, into a good far greater than should have existed without this evil; so that in the end, the present order should, as a whole, be more perfect than all others. Thus, for example, the fall of Adam was corrected, with an immeasurable gain of perfection, by the Incarnation of the Word, and the treason of Judas by the Redemption of the human race.

Hence when some of the angels fell, through an impulse, as it appears, of pride; and when afterwards the first man, under the seduction of the evil angel, fell through concupiscence; — for the former is a sin characteristic of the diabolical, the latter of the animal nature; — original sin invaded the human race in the person of our first parent; that is to say, a certain depraved quality was contracted, which, from the darkness of the intellect and the predominance of the senses which it induces, renders men slothful in the performance of good, and prompt in the commission of evil actions. And although the soul, as it emanates from God, (for the notion of a transmission of souls is unintelligible) is pure, yet, through the sin of our parents, it is corrupted by its very union with the body; in other words, by its connexion with external things, original sin, or a disposition to sin, is produced in the soul; although it is not possible to conceive any moment at which it was itself pure from stain, and was doomed to be imprisoned in an infected body. And thus were all made “*children of wrath*,” “*concluded under sin*,” and doomed to inevitable perdition, unless preserved by a great grace of God. We are not, however, to extend the effect of original sin so far as to hold that children who have committed no actual sin will be damned — an opinion which many maintain; for, under God, who is a just judge, no one can be condemned to misery without a fault of his own.

Actual sins are of two kinds; some venial, which must be expiated by temporal chastisement, others mortal, which merit eternal perdition. And this division of sin not only is an ancient one, but also appears perfectly consonant with the divine justice; nor can I commend the views of those, who, like the Stoics, regard all sins as almost equal, or all alike worthy of the extreme punishment of eternal damnation. Now those sins appear specially to merit the name of mortal, which are committed with a perverse intention, and against the express dictate of conscience, and the principles of virtue implanted in the mind. For it would seem that those who depart from this life at enmity with God (as they are no longer recalled by external impressions of sense,) persevere in the course which they have commenced, and retain the state of mind in which they were surprised, and that, by this very fact, they are separated from God; whence, by a kind of consequence, they fall into the supreme misery of the soul, and thus become, so to speak, the instrument of their own damnation.

Now all men, being born in sin, and not as yet regenerated by the grace of the Holy Ghost, are wont, when they have attained the use of reason, to fall into mortal sins, at least unless they are withheld by some singular favour of God; for, by the voice of conscience, all are admonished of the distinction of good and evil, and yet are occasionally overcome by the passions. And consequently the whole human race would perish, had not God, from eternity, formed a design for its redemption or expiation, worthy of his mercy, as well as his unspeakable wisdom, which He executed in his own season.

For we must hold as a certain principle, that “God desireth not the death of the sinner,” but “will have all men to be *saved*,” — not, it is true, with an absolute and irresistible will, but with a will ordered and limited by certain laws; — and consequently, that He assists each individual as far as is consistent with the order of his wisdom and justice.

The principles hitherto stated are almost all evident from the light of reason itself; but it is only from the revelation of God that we could have learnt what was the hidden economy of the Divine counsel in the restoration of the human race.

We must call to mind, therefore, that God is not only the First Substance, the Author and Preserver of all others, but that He is also the most perfect Intelligence; and that, in this relation, He is invested with a moral quality, and enters into a certain society with other intelligences, over all of whom, collected into a most perfect commonwealth, which we may call “the City of God,” He presides, as a supreme monarch over his subjects.

God, therefore, not only acts by that general and hidden will by which He governs, according to certain fixed rules, the entire machine of the universe, and by which He concurs with all the actions of intelligent beings; but also, in his capacity of legislator, declares, and sanctions by rewards and punishments, his particular and public will with regard to the acts of intelligent beings and the government of his city; and for this purpose He has instituted revelations.

Now, revelation must be invested with certain notes (commonly called motives of credibility), from which it may appear, that what is contained therein and declared to us, is the will of God, not an illusion of the evil genius, or a false interpretation of our own; and if any revelation be destitute of these notes, we cannot embrace it with security: with this restriction, however, that sometimes, in a case of doubt, when the mandate in itself is not at variance with reason or with any previous revelation, and is supported by probable reasons, it is better to obey it than to expose ourselves to danger of sin. In this, however, we must be cautious lest fear should degenerate into superstition, and credit be given to every “old wives” tale. For it would be unworthy

the Divine Wisdom to omit a precaution which no prudent legislator neglects, that of notifying sufficiently the will of the lawgiver. Hence faith is not lightly to be given to lots, to visions, or to dreams, and not at all to auguries, omens, and such other trifles, which (under the notion that they are signs of the Divine counsel) we absurdly call divinations.

As right reason, therefore, is the natural interpreter of God, it is necessary that, before any other interpreters of God be recognised, reason should be able to pronounce upon their authority; but when they have once, so to speak, established their legitimate character, reason itself must thenceforward submit to faith. And this may be understood from the example of a governor who commands in a province or garrison as the representative of his prince; he will not lightly, nor without cautious scrutiny of his credentials, yield up his authority to the successor who may be sent to replace him, lest an enemy steal in under this guise. But the moment he recognises his master's will, he will at once, without dispute, submit himself and the entire garrison to the new authority.

Nevertheless, in addition to the evidences of human faith, or motives of credibility, there is further required a certain internal operation of the Holy Ghost, which invests it with the title of divine faith, and confirms the mind in the truth; and hence it is that faith may exist where there is not, and perhaps never has been, any advertence to these motives drawn from human reason; for it is not necessary at all times, nor for all persons, to enter into an analysis of faith, nor is every person equal to the difficulty of such an examination. The very nature of true faith, however, necessarily supposes that those who, in the fear of God, attentively examine the truth, should be able, when occasion requires, to institute an analysis of its motives; if it were not so, the Christian religion would have nothing to distinguish it from a false system, speciously adorned.

All the notes of divine revelation, with the exception of one — the excellence of the doctrine itself — may be resolved into that of confirmation by miracle, or by some wondrous and inimitable circumstance, or event, or coincidence, which it is impossible to ascribe to chance. For this is an especial sign that the admonition is from Providence. Now this is peculiarly the effect of prophecy; for to predict future events accurately and circumstantially exceeds not only all human, but even all created powers. Hence we are bound to give credit both to the prophet himself and to the person whose coming is found to verify the conditions of the prophecy. So, also, if any one perform other wonderful and, humanly speaking, incredible works, we must recognise him as aided by a superhuman power.

Furthermore, if miracles of this character, though performed long since, be attested by those arguments by which, in other cases, the truth of historical facts is legitimately proved, we are bound to believe them, just as well as if they were performed to-day. For, even in the management of our human affairs, how many things do we admit as undoubted (and that with perfect propriety and prudence) which we have neither tested by our senses, nor are able to prove by demonstrative arguments! And, indeed, as St. Augustine well shews in his book *On the Utility of Believing*, most of our actions, even in the affairs of common life, rest on faith, and yet are not on that account less successful in their issue, or less prudent in their design. Nor can we hesitate to hold as certain, that the Providence which rules the universe will never permit falsehood to invest itself with all the distinctive badges of truth, and, so to speak, her official robes.

The brevity which we propose to ourselves does not permit our entering, in this place, into the evidences of the truth of the Christian religion. Many eminent men have

already ably executed this task; as, for example, Origen, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Cyril, Theodoret, St. Thomas in his work *Against the Gentiles*; and, more recently, Steuchus, Mornay, Grotius, Huet; and although we might be able to add much to what they have written (for the various evidences of truth are innumerable), yet we are far from seeking to detract from their merit.

The sacred monuments of Christians teach that the Supreme God (whose unity is established by the evidence of reason itself) is nevertheless three in Persons, and consequently (a mystery which surpasses all reason) that, in one only God, there are three Persons of the Divinity; that these, to human comprehension, may very fitly be called the Father, the Son or Word, and the Holy Ghost; and that the Son is born of the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds, according to the Latins, from both the Father and the Son, or, according to the Greeks, from the Father through the Son (and that as from one principle).

This, however, must be understood so as to avoid all suspicion of Tritheism; and therefore, when it is said, “the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, and these three are different from one another” (so that the Father is not the Son or the Holy Ghost, nor the Son the Holy Ghost or the Father, nor the Holy Ghost the Father or the Son), it must be understood in the sense that nevertheless there are not three Gods, but only one God, though three in Persons.

The Anti-trinitarians, indeed, insist that this is a contradiction, and that the plural number has no other force but to express that the three Beings, distinct from one another, each of whom is God, are three Gods, and that things which are distinct in number cannot be one in number.

But they should reflect that the Church does not assert of the Father, for instance, or of the Son, that He is three in Persons, but that He is one Person of the Divinity; hence the multiplication of Persons does not involve the multiplication of God, three in Persons; nor, therefore, does the Trinity of Persons imply three Gods. Moreover, a person, generally, is a substance numerically one and incommunicable; and, in God, it essentially involves a relation, and, together with its correlates, constitutes an absolute substance numerically one. There are, therefore, three singular substances, and one absolute relation which embraces these, and whose undivided nature is communicated to each. Of this we may discover some faint resemblance in the operations of our own mind, considering and loving itself.

It was by this illustration, adapted to our comprehension, that the ancients were wont, and, in my opinion, judiciously, to explain this mystery, viz. by the analogy of the three chief faculties of the mind or requisites of action, namely, Power, Knowledge, and Will; Power being ascribed to the Father, as the source of the Divinity; Wisdom to the Son, as the Word of the mind; and Will or Love to the Holy Ghost: for, from the Virtue or Power of the Divine Essence spring Ideas of things, or Truths; these Wisdom embraces; and thus, in the end, they become, according to their several perfection, objects of the Will: an illustration which also explains the order of the Divine Persons.

As it had been decreed, therefore, in the eternal secrets of the Divine counsel, that one of the Persons of the Divinity should take upon Him the nature of the creature, and, in a peculiar manner, adapted to our comprehension, should govern, like a king, familiarly and openly, the city of God, or the commonwealth of intelligences, it pleased the only-begotten Son of the Father to take this office upon Himself, the Word of the Divine Mind already eminently containing in itself the ideas or natures of creatures.

And He assumed the nature of man, not alone because in man the superior and inferior natures meet, as if upon a common boundary, but also because there is no other more worthy means of attaining the expiation of the human race, which was the first care of God; and it seemed fitting that the Son made Man should Himself exemplify every virtue, and should triumph by perfect humility and patience, before man should be crowned with the incredible glory to which he is thus elevated.

We learn, therefore, from Divine revelation, that, when the pre-ordained time arrived, the Word, or only-begotten Son of God, assumed our entire human nature, consisting of soul and body; and that, while He sojourned on earth, He acted as man, in every thing except sin, from which He was exempt, and miracles, by which He shewed Himself to be greater than man. And He was called Jesus, surnamed Christ, as being the Anointed of the Lord, or the King or Messiah, the Restorer of the human race long foretold by the oracles of the prophets.

The holy Fathers admirably illustrate the mystery of the Incarnation by the analogy of the union of soul and body: “for as soul and body is one man, so God and Man is one Christ.” The illustration, however, is imperfect, for the soul partakes in some things of the imperfections of the body, while the Divine Nature cannot admit imperfection. Still the words ‘person’ and ‘nature’ are very fitly applied; for as a plurality of Persons possess the one nature of the Divinity, so, on the other hand, one Person of the Divinity embraces a plurality of natures, the divine and human.

Nor do I see any reason for the abhorrence which many sectaries, both ancient and modern, exhibit for these opinions. For if one weigh the matter fairly, he will find that the doctrines of the Catholic Church on the Trinity and Incarnation are safe, and that those of her adversaries are replete with danger. Because the Church defines that only one absolute substance is to be adored, viz. the supreme, omniscient, and almighty God; and neither in the Word, nor in the Holy Ghost, nor in the man Jesus, does she honour with supreme adoration aught else than this one eternal Being.

The practice of the Church, therefore, is blameless, if it be but duly inculcated upon the people; nor does there appear any reason why we should regard as unworthy of God, either this internal undivided Trinity, or the external assumption of the human nature, which receives perfections from the Godhead, but does not return its own imperfections thereto.

Now the Arians, on the contrary, regard the Son of God merely as the first of creatures, and some of them under the name of the Holy Ghost understand the angels; and yet they scruple not to worship, with divine honours, what they thus regard as a creature. The Photinians, regarding Christ as a simple man, make Him an adoptive Son of God, and yet adore this factitious and subordinate Deity — a doctrine which certainly appears to coincide with that of the Pagans; and, if their hypothesis be once admitted, Francis Davidis acted more consistently in denying all adoration to one whom he professed to be a mere man; although how slight the interval between this opinion and that of Mahomet himself!

With regard to the mode of the union of natures, many subtle questions are raised, which it would have been better to have left untouched; among others, that respecting the “communion of properties,” namely, whether, and how far, the properties of one nature may be attributed to the other; as though it were necessary to decide this question. It is enough to know that the properties which are attributed to each nature separately may rightly be attributed to the concrete; for it is correct to say, that, in Christ, God suffered, man is omniscient and omnipotent; but to attribute to the humanity, in virtue of the union, omnipotence, ubiquity, and (what especially follows)

eternity, is as incongruous, as to ascribe to the Divinity the having been born and suffered; a form of speech which is either an impropriety or a contradiction.

We must hold, however, that, by the union with the Word, all the perfection, knowledge, and power, which man, as man, is capable of receiving, have been imparted to the humanity in itself; and it is safer to affirm this regarding Christ, even in the state of exinanition; although in that state, as the body remained passible, the hidden glory only appeared, as it were, by a few rays, shining out through the night.

Christ, then, the Son of God and of man, born, without man's agency, of a Virgin Mother, and exempt from all sin, offered Himself to God the Father, a most worthy victim, for the expiation of the guilt of the human race; satisfied, by his perfect humility and his passion, for the sins of men; and therefore, as far as was in Him, died for all.

Nevertheless, it has pleased God to ordain as the law of man's redemption, that its benefit should extend to all who, having been born again in Christ by the grace of the Holy Ghost, should elicit a filial act of faith and love: for although a perpetual purity of mind and fervour of disposition towards God are, in the rigour of justice, always necessary, yet, through the equity of Divine grace, it has been effected by Christ, that, even in a person who falls after regeneration, every past sin shall be effaced by the sincere love of God, and (what is included therein) repentance for the past and a resolution of amendment.

In the course of the last century, certain angry controversies arose on the questions of the conversion of man, of the justification of the sinner, and of the merit of good works, occasioned by the inconvenient expressions of some of the disputants, and the excesses of others on the opposite side. In my opinion, however, they may easily be adjusted, if one will but discard the sophistry in which they have been involved, and consider the subject on its own merits.

In the first place, therefore, we must hold that, by the fall, human nature has been so thoroughly corrupted, that, without the aid of Divine grace, it is unable not alone to perform, but even to originate, any good work or any act agreeable to God. Without the aid, therefore, of *preventing* and *exciting* grace, we are not capable either of prayer, or of the wish or desire of amending our life or seeking the true faith, or, in general, of any good motion.

But, upon the other hand, we must also hold that man's free will is not destroyed by the fall, even in things divine and necessary for salvation; but that all voluntary acts (although they are excited by grace if they be good, and proceed from our corrupt nature if they be bad,) are, nevertheless, "spontaneous with election," and therefore free: — in the same way as it does not interfere with the liberty of our actions in common life, that we are excited to these actions by rays of light which are transmitted through the agency of the eyes, and though the excitement is sometimes so powerful that, notwithstanding our deliberation, and the power which we still retain of resisting the impressions, it may yet be foreseen that the act will certainly follow; — for the certainty of an act is one thing, and its necessity another. And hence a sinful action is contingent, and the act of eliciting good motions is free. And although the impulse under which we act, and the aid which we receive, are from God, yet there is always some co-operation on man's part, else he could not be said to have acted.

The ulterior questions — as, whether, in the unregenerate, these powers of producing good motions are mutilated or only impeded, and what illustrations may best be employed to explain the aid afforded by grace — are very idle and profitless discussions, raised by those who exert all their ingenuity to discover, in the doctrines of the Church, matter at which to cavil, with any shew of reason, however trivial.

To all men God gives *sufficient grace*? in so far that, supposing only a serious will on their part, there is no further requisite for the attainment of salvation which it is not in their own power to secure. And hence many pious men have held it as certain, that “*every man who cometh into this world*” is so “*enlightened*” by the Light of Souls, the eternal Son of God, and by his Holy Spirit, that, at least before his death, provided he himself wills it, he may attain, either by external preaching or by internal enlightenment of the mind, to such knowledge as is sufficient and necessary for salvation; so that if, after this enlightenment, he obstinately resist the call of God, he may at least be rendered inexcusable; for this is necessary for the vindication of the Divine justice. But as to the means by which God effects this, even in the case of those to whom no suspicion of the Gospel of Christ has ever been conveyed by the external preaching of the word this is a question which we may not venture hastily to decide, but must leave to his wisdom and mercy.

God, however, does not grant always, and to all men, that *efficacious* or *victorious grace* which actually produces the good-will, overcomes the inclinations of man, and outweighs the opposing solicitations of imperfect or corrupt nature; otherwise all men, without exception, would be saved. But the reason why this is not done, — that is, why, in preference to many others equally possible, certain persons are admitted into existence by God, although the notion or foreknowledge of them involves the idea of impenitence, and of other free actions incompatible with salvation, and of certain degrees of divine grace inferior to the crowning and victorious grace, — belongs to the mysteries of God’s government, inaccessible to mortals; and on such questions we must rest satisfied with this one principle, that whatever has pleased God is best; that in no other order could the perfection of things be better attained; and that, as we have already observed, the evils which God permits are always converted into a much greater good.

Nevertheless, we are not to imagine that the Divine will for men’s salvation, or the merits of Christ, or, at least, efficacious grace, are confined solely to the elect — that is, to those to whom the crowning and final grace of blessed perseverance is vouchsafed. For Christ died for all; and efficacious grace, and that true conversion and regeneration through the Spirit of God, whereby we are received into the number of his children, may be granted to many who will not persevere. Nor do I see how certain learned men can have been betrayed into such monstrous paradoxes, revolting both in their intrinsic meaning and in their consequences, as, (fixing a law, as it were, for God, and circumscribing according to their caprice the economy of Divine grace,) to imagine that a person who is not to persevere does not really receive grace, and is not really regenerated by the Holy Ghost, no matter what works he may perform, no matter how pious and well-disposed he may appear to himself and to others; and on the contrary, that a person who is truly elect, and destined to final penitence, never forfeits the grace once received from God, and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, even though he should spend his whole life in a series of adulteries and murders. Indeed, even though it were possible to excuse these novel and offensive dogmas, I do not see on what foundation they rest, or what purpose of edification they can serve. For, if expressions occasionally occur which would appear to favour this revolting opinion, it is better to soften them down by comparison with others far more numerous, than to add to their harshness by a rigorous interpretation. And it seems more consonant with the attributes of God to grant a temporary and revocable, but visible, grace, than a grace perpetual and inadmissible, but utterly hidden, and compatible with the most depraved habit of soul and the most heinous crimes.

When man, therefore, by God's preventing grace, is aroused from the deadly sleep of sin to a knowledge of his misery, a spirit of self-examination, and a firm resolve of seeking and following the saving truth; and when, rejecting or disregarding all other thoughts and affections, and all worldly or carnal maxims, he devotes his whole energies to the care of salvation; he perceives, even from the light of nature, what is the law and the will of God; and, admonished by memory, he acknowledges with groans and trembling how far he has strayed therefrom, what grievous punishment he has merited, and how heinously he has offended his Creator, to whom he owed supreme honour and love. Pursuing this consideration, he elicits from amid the terrors of conscience the light of returning hope; for he discovers that the same most just Judge, in his infinite mercy, still takes pity upon human weakness, and that He has not laid aside his good-will towards sinners, provided, while there is yet time, they seek a refuge in his mercy. And thus as, to all who seriously turn to God, the Gospel holds forth Christ as the haven of salvation, which all may reach by true penitence — (and penitence, in order to be sufficient, must proceed, not from fear of punishment or hope of reward alone, but from sincere love of God) — whether it be the penitence of those who are received for the first time into the Church of God, as in the baptism of adults, or of those who, having been again imperilled in the gulf of sin, betake themselves anew to penance, as to a second plank after shipwreck; — and as God promises to those who turn to Him and do penance, not only pardon of past sins, but also new strength for a better life, and the Holy Ghost and regeneration; — hence follows the justification of the sinner; whereby he is not only absolved from guilt, through the satisfaction of Christ laid hold on by faith, but also, by the infusion of the charity of Divine love, is invested with the habit of justice and the new man.

Now, as these principles are certain and almost universally admitted, it seems to me very idle to enter into the controversies which have been raised by certain writers concerning the form of justification, viz. whether it consists in the imputation of the merit and satisfaction of Christ, or in habitual infused justice. For as all are compelled to admit that both are necessary, where is the need for further discussion? and where shall we find a dispute about words, if this be not such? If justification be taken, as it is usually taken by jurists, to mean freedom from imputability, it is manifest that the essence of our justification, that is, of our innocence, consists in the imputation of Christ's satisfaction to us, in virtue whereof pardon is granted to those who believe, and do penance. But if justification be understood, as in ethics, to mean, the being invested with the habit of justice — as it is said in the Apocalypse: "He that is just, let him be justified still — that is, "let his habit of justice increase;" — it is evident that this habit of justice is infused into us by God in the act of regeneration, when we put on the new man. Whence it may not inaptly be said that the gift of penance and of pardon (not to speak of the other favours, by which God assists and prevents us, even before the work of regeneration is complete,) is a "grace given gratuitously whereas the infusion of the new habit is a grace given to penitents in virtue of an institution congruous to the Divine wisdom— "a grace which renders us grateful and pleasing" to God, which really operates a conversion of our mind, and crowns the whole work of our regeneration. But, however this may be, we must hold, that to the notion of justification, even considered as consisting in the remission of imputability, not faith only, but also penance, and therefore charity, is necessary.

Equally profitless is it to contrast the two divine virtues, faith and charity, with one another, to raise, as it were, a question of precedence between them, and to discuss anxiously which of them has the principal share in justification. For in the same way as it is certain that faith without charity is dead, so also is it certain that charity

without faith (love without knowledge) is of no effect. And hence faith is an essential of charity, charity a complement of faith.

And indeed some of those who attribute justification entirely and exclusively to faith, and maintain that the other virtues will indubitably follow as fruits of justification by faith, seem to adopt a notion of faith different from that which has heretofore been received in the schools; for they refer faith not only to the intellect, but also to the will; nay, they extend their notion of the idea of faith so far as to make it comprise filial confidence in God, which seems to me to involve charity or the love of God. It is not wonderful, therefore, that they hold men to be justified by faith alone, whereas under faith they comprise hope and charity; and therefore, if they think so, the question becomes a mere dispute of words.

It must be admitted, indeed, that, even according to the received notions, faith, or assent, partakes, in a certain sense, of the will; for, were it otherwise, the act could not be commanded by God, nor elicited by men in obedience to the command, though they desired to do so. And, in truth, we often see men hold a thing as true, although they are not able to assign, nay perhaps never have been conscious of, any reason for their opinion; and this is the nature of the faith which, as we have said above, is excited by God in the minds even of simple people who do not inquire into the reasons of their belief; so that, in truth, this unreasoning assent consists in that state of mind which produces in those who are under its influence the same dispositions, and prepares them to act and to suffer as efficaciously as the persons who are conscious of motives for their belief, and sometimes more efficaciously. The matter may be understood from an illustration: We know that there are persons who, as far as arguments go, are satisfied that they will never meet ghosts in the dark, and who, nevertheless, will not venture to walk alone at night, or, if they do, are seized with a kind of panic fear. On the contrary, there are others who never even think of arguments against the fear of ghosts, and who, notwithstanding, secured by the firm faith and conviction which they possess, fearlessly spend whole nights alone in the woods and in the dens of wild beasts. Thus, in the case of the former, there seems to be a kind of speculative opinion, in that of the latter, rather a practical assent — a quality which undoubtedly is especially required in faith. And Christ himself has said that there are many degrees of faith; and the highest of these are to be derived, not so much from the mere intellect (otherwise those whose learning was greater would have the greater faith, which certainly was not true of the Canaanite woman, or of the centurion of Capharnaum, though Christ himself attributed great faith to them), as from the affection of the mind, and its readiness to embrace the doctrine when imparted, although reason should appear not only not to favour it, but even to be at variance with it. However, faith, or practical assent to the articles of the Christian religion as a whole, may be altogether distinguished from hope and charity, and from the filial confidence by which we apply general doctrines specially to ourselves.

Nor are we to imagine, as some have done, that, in order to justification, it is required that a man should believe with divine faith that he is justified, much less that he is elect and secure of persevering; for, as there are many who have true faith, and yet will not persevere, it would follow that these persons were bound, by virtue of the faith which is necessary to justification, to believe what is false. But, besides, those who require in the person who is justified a previous belief of his own justification, involve themselves in contradictions. For, if the belief of one's justification is required for justification, and therefore precedes it, it follows that a man who is not yet justified must believe that he is justified, and, therefore, that he must believe what is false. And if they content themselves with requiring from him a belief that he

certainly will be justified, they escape these contradictions, it is true, but, on the other hand, they arbitrarily invent conditions of justification which are entirely without any warrant either of reason or of Scripture. For if a man possess faith and charity, he will also have the grace of justification, though he should not even advert to the reflex act, whether he receives it or not. Nor does this filial confidence, or the hope by which we believe and trust that our sins are remitted, and that we are received into favour and made children of God, belong to that divine faith in the general promises and infallible revelations of God; because this confidence has for its object not alone the contemplation of the Divine goodness, but also individual human things regarding matters of fact; and it springs from the consideration and memory of things which pass in our mind; and consequently does not rise beyond moral certainty. Should any doubts, therefore, arise from the consciousness of our own infirmity, they do not destroy this filial confidence; in the same way as temptations of doubt regarding the articles of religion do not destroy the substance of faith, even though it be languid. It is our duty, however, to struggle against these doubts; for, if we but fix our thoughts firmly upon God's goodness, we must conclude that He will never suffer those who "thirst after truth," and seek grace, to be deceived by falsehood to their own destruction, or to fail of obtaining mercy.

That charity, or love, which is a divine virtue, consists in our loving God above all things, and seeking in Him our sovereign good; and, therefore, we are to love Him, not only for the benefits which He bestows on us, but also for Himself, and as our last end. For, in general, it is of the nature of that true love which is called "the love of friendship," to place our happiness and perfection in the perfection or happiness of the beloved object; in part, if the object be of finite perfection (as when we love children or friends), but entirely, if it be of supreme excellence and goodness.

Hope, as used by theologians, is that love which is called "a love of concupiscence," or an affection towards God, springing from the consideration, not of God's excellence and perfection, but of his beneficence towards ourselves, and of the great benefits which He promises to his servants, and especially that of eternal life; — although it may be that the consideration of God's benefits may also manifest his perfection to us; in which case hope is elevated into charity.

And as the evidence of reason and of Scripture assures us that true and perfect charity is not only prescribed by God, but is moreover the highest service which man can render to his God, and that without it *faith is dead*, therefore has it been justly and congruously ordained that through it our justification, reconciliation, and renovation are completed; although the actual grace of charity is obtained for us, and granted to us, solely through Christ, while we are still separated from God; and although its power of effacing sin springs solely from Christ's merit, imputed to us through a lively faith. For, as we have already said, in the rigour of Divine justice it would not suffice for the pardon of past sin to love once, but it would be necessary to have always maintained these good dispositions. But, seeing that Christ has satisfied for us, the conditions which God requires in order that we be made sharers of Christ's merit are easy of fulfilment; for it is not possible, consistently with the order of the Divine justice and wisdom, to understand or imagine any condition more easy of fulfilment, than that of the love of God himself, the most amiable and fairest of all conceivable objects, which is the sole condition required of us by Him, after Christ's satisfaction, as the price of the restoration of his friendship, — a price in itself utterly inadequate.

And whereas in those to whom God's abiding grace has been vouchsafed through Christ, there is no longer any sin, any thing hateful to God, "*any condemnation*" it appears inconsistent with the form of sound words to say that original sin remains

after regeneration, though it is weakened or is not imputed; and we shall consult more for the propriety of language if we say, that what constitutes in the original evil the distinctive character of sin, is effaced in regeneration through the merits of Christ and the efficacy of the Holy Spirit; although the flame of corrupt nature is not entirely extinguished; and although, from the infirmity of human nature, even the just are occasionally betrayed into venial errors.

The question then arises, what it is in original sin that possesses the distinctive character of sin? for neither the sole privation of original justice, nor the positive stain of our nature which always clings to us, constitutes the distinctive character of sin. There are some Catholic divines, therefore, who hold that, in original sin, what constitutes the form of sin, is nothing else than the imputation of the crime committed by Adam, or simply the imputability itself; others acknowledge in it nothing, at least nothing positive, in which the nature of sin can be placed, and seek it altogether in the defect of original justice; they conceive, however, that there is something more than this, which they explain by an illustration. It is certain that the intention, like every other act of the mind, is of two kinds — virtual and actual; a virtual intention, such as they contemplate, is sometimes found in a person baptising, or administering any other sacrament; for the intention, provided it existed in the beginning, is supposed to endure throughout the entire time of the act, although the mind may not always advert to what it is doing, or, perhaps, may even be carried away by other thoughts, during the entire action, without ever reverting to the act in which it is engaged. Hence it may be said that the condition of those who are affected by original sin is somewhat similar; and we may conceive that all men have, in some hidden way, sinned in Adam, and that, as their will has been depraved by Adam's sin, they have always retained, until the restoration of grace, something analogous to a virtual intention of sinning, which, before regeneration, prevails over even their good motions, or, at least, mingles itself with them. It must be understood, however, at the same time, that this virtual evil intention is removed by true penance along with the guilt; and that the only effect which remains is the concupiscence of the flesh rebelling against the spirit.

We must be careful however, not to underrate the evil influence of original sin, as though the natural powers which existed before the fall are not much lessened and depraved thereby; lest, having been delivered from it, we should detract from the favour which God has thus bestowed on us; nor should we think lightly of the relics of it which still cling to us, as though they were trifling and easily overcome, lest perchance we be betrayed into undue arrogance.

But neither should we, on the other hand, so far exaggerate its evil effects, as to say that no good whatever is left, and that every act of the unregenerate is of itself a sin; for St. Augustine (Ep. 130) admits that the continence of Polemon was a gift of God; now, who would assert that to be a sin, which is given by God? Nor, again, are to imagine that original sin has struck its roots so deeply, as not to give way even to Divine grace and to the cleansing and sanctifying blood of the Saviour; as though even that involuntary concupiscence which, from the very composition of the human machine as at present constituted, remains even in the pious, is to be regarded as a sin; whereas no involuntary act can ever be a sin; and it is wrong to pervert the true notions of things, under pretence of a mistaken interpretation of Scripture.

Let us now examine what are the fruits of regeneration, in what manner good works arise therefrom, and what is the efficacy of such works. We have already said that, before regeneration, the love of God is necessary for the performance of that penance which is available for salvation; that from this penance, through the merit of

Christ apprehended by faith, follows pardon of sin and renovation of the entire man, or the virtue of Divine charity; and that (although the habits of the other virtues are acquired only by repeated acts) this virtue, through the mercy of God, is infused on account of a single act of love. Now this habit is essentially active; for by its very nature it is constantly endeavouring to burst forth into action, seeking opportunities of acting, and turning them to a profitable account. It may be safely asserted, therefore, that good works, as far as they consist in a serious will, are necessary to salvation; for a man who does not love God is neither a friend of God nor in the state of grace, because both penance and the renovation of man involve a contradiction, unless they are accompanied by love. Now all good works are, according to the received phrase, virtually contained in this right intention and sincere affection towards God; and this is the "*one thing necessary*," which Christ admonished us should be preferred to all else beside.

Whosoever, therefore, loves God above all things, acquiesces, as I have already observed, in his will as regards the past, even though he should seem to be deserted, and should find himself condemned to struggle with many adversities; being firmly persuaded that God is good and faithful, that He tenderly loves "men of good will," and that He disposes all things so as to turn, in the end, to the good of those who love Him. And, as regards the future, he endeavours with all possible fervour to obey the commands of God, not alone those which are expressly revealed, but also those which are presumed from the consideration of the Divine glory or of the public good. And in cases of doubt he chooses the part which is safer, more probable, and more advantageous; in the same way as an active, industrious, and zealous minister would act, if entrusted by a great prince with the management of his affairs. For there is no greater or better master than God; none to whose exclusive service all our powers may more rightfully be devoted.

From the love of God springs the love of our brother; that is to say, of every man with whom we may in any way be brought into connexion. And the idleness and insincerity of professions of the love of God in one who loves not his brother, are admirably inculcated by John, of whom it is related by Jerome, that in his extreme old age, when carried in the arms of his disciples to the church, he used to confine himself to one single exhortation, "My little children, love one another!" — and that when, at last, some one, wearied by the unvarying repetition, asked why he always inculcated this precept, and this alone, he replied by a sentiment truly worthy of John: "Because," said he, "it is our Lord's command, and its observance is alone sufficient." Now Christ himself has prescribed an admirable rule of fraternal love, and one which even the Gentiles warmly applauded, viz. "that we love our neighbour as ourselves, and therefore that we do, or refrain from doing, to others, what we would, or would not, that others should do to us." But, although there is no doubt that "charity begins at home," and that, as regards others, this all-embracing and universal benevolence should make us select as its object that person on whom the conferring the benefit will be productive of the greatest advantage to the glory of God and the common good, yet it is right, notwithstanding, to prefer the salvation, the life, or any other great advantage, even of a stranger, to an inconsiderable inconvenience of ourselves or others.

Good works, then, are those which are undertaken with a right intention for the glory of God and the public good. Under this class, therefore, are comprised the following: that each one should pursue his own calling — that is, apply himself to those duties for the successful discharge of which the talents and opportunities granted him by God appear to qualify him; that, in the next place, he should acquit

himself accurately of the obligations of the public office or station in life which he has embraced, and labour to perfect the sphere which has been assigned to him; that, in his other relations, he should discharge towards all men the common offices of humanity; that he should not abandon, unless compelled by necessity, any one who is in peril, and whom it is in his power to assist; and that, even where his assistance is solicited in advancing the mere convenience of another, he should not withhold it, provided the advantage which is sought is not prejudicial to himself or others. And in general he should direct his thoughts so as to procure the greatest amount of good, and for the greatest possible number; and should seek, in all things, to advance the glory of God. The first care of the truly pious man, therefore, will be to be frugal of time, lest he should spend any portion of his life unprofitably; and he will abstain, as far as possible, even from allowable recreations; unless when, from his position in active life, he is drawn into places of public report, either by the necessary relaxation of mind and the care of health, or by the contingencies of business, or the decorous observances of society. For the austerity which would perpetually exclude every one from feasts, shows, games, dances, and the other amusements and exercises of courts, is no part of true piety: for these relaxations, in some cases, are not a waste of time, but useful instruments of business. It is right, however, that they should be indulged with discretion. And the virtuous man will shew by his conduct that they are but of secondary interest in his eyes, and that it is only through some necessity he is induced to take part in them.

And as there are various ways, according to the condition and disposition of each individual, of advancing the glory of God and the welfare of men, either by actual service or by example, it is manifestly a source of great advantage that there should be in the Church a class distinct from those who are engaged in the active occupations and duties of every-day life — a class of ascetic and contemplative men, who, discarding the cares, and triumphing over the pleasures, of life, devote themselves entirely to the contemplation of the Deity, and the admiration of his works; or who, divesting themselves of all personal concerns, attend exclusively, and apply all their energies, to the relief of the necessities of others, either by instructing the ignorant and erring, or by succouring the needy and distressed. Nor is it among the least of the reasons which commend that Church which alone has retained the name and badges of Catholic, that it is in her alone we see universally exhibited and encouraged eminent examples of the exalted virtues and of the ascetic life.

I confess, therefore, that I have always warmly approved of religious orders, of pious confraternities and associations, and similar praiseworthy institutions. For, provided they are purified from corruptions and abuses, governed according to the institutes of their founders, and regulated by the sovereign Pontiff for the interest of the entire Church, they seem to be, as it were, an army of heaven upon earth. For what can be more glorious than to carry the light of truth to distant nations, across the seas, and through fire and sword; to know no traffic but in the salvation of souls alone; to renounce every allurements of pleasure, even the enjoyment of conversation and of society, in order to give oneself to the contemplation of abstract truths, and to meditation on the things of God; to dedicate oneself to the training up of youth to learning and virtue; to carry relief and assistance to the wretched, the despairing, the abandoned, the captive, the condemned, in squalidness, in chains, in distant lands; and not to be deterred, even by the fear of pestilence, from these offices of prodigal charity! The man who knows not, or despises, these things, has but a plebeian and vulgar conception of virtue; he foolishly limits man's obligations to God by the perfunctory discharge of every-day duties, and by that cold habit of life, without zeal,

without spirit, by which men's minds are commonly regulated. Whereas it is not a mere counsel, as some persuade themselves, but a precept, that every man, in every state of life, should strive, with all the powers of soul and body, towards Christian perfection; the practice of which perfection is not incompatible either with wedlock, or with the care of children, or with the occupations of office or of military life, though all these states increase the obstacles to its attainment. But the counsel is, to choose that state of life which is more free from earthly impediments; the choice on which our Lord congratulated Magdalen.

From the description of good works, however, let us come to their effect; and in the discussion of this question I find that their meritoriousness is commonly disputed, and that the opinion which for so many ages had been received in the Church is grievously misrepresented, as being full of pharisaical presumption and pride. I think, however, that if the terms be rightly explained, no ground of censure will remain.

We must bear in mind, therefore, that it is only by a certain analogy that the ideas of obligation and right are applied to us, in relation to God. For all things belong to God, because He created them, He preserves them, and He alone can wisely govern them. By virtue, therefore, of his supreme perfection, or of his supreme wisdom and power, God is naturally the Lord of all; and we are but servants, to whom, in order that we may trade thereon, He has given a certain portion, which Christ called "a talent." Now, between the servant and the master there arises, with regard to this portion, merely an imaginary right, drawn from the master's own kindness and condescension. In the same way — to employ another illustration — as while a master plays at chess with his slave, every one knows that whatever is won or lost is the master's; but yet a sensible master will not derange the rules of the game by an ill-timed display of his authority. This explanation being pre-supposed and understood, we may speak securely, and without fear of censure, of an "as-if-obligation" on the part of God, and a right, or "*as-if-right*," on our own part.

Furthermore, as a right taken strictly is twofold; viz. a complete right, which gives an action, such as the right which arises from a contract; and an incomplete right, which produces an obligation, but gives no action of recovery, such as the right of the pauper to the alms which the rich man is bound to give him; so also our "as-if-right," which produces an "as-if-obligation" in God, is twofold, viz. either "a right of congruity," or "a right of condignness;" for it is congruous to God's justice to reward those who love Him with eternal happiness; — not indeed that it is so absolutely, and from the sole consideration of justice (if we abstract from a promise), for a less retribution than this would suffice, but from the further consideration of his wisdom, inasmuch as He has decreed to diffuse throughout his kingdom the greatest amount of happiness of which it may be susceptible; for, this decree of his wisdom once being supposed, it belongs to distributive justice that, of those who love God, not merely some individuals, selected, as it were, with an acception of persons, but all, without any exception, should be admitted to eternal felicity.

God, however, has Himself undertaken a greater obligation, from which it appears to me that we may derive even merit of condignness, and from which, according to the laws of commutative justice, a more complete right arises in our favour. For God has entered into a contract with his Son, and, through the merits of Christ, we have been admitted into the same treaty. Now, the nature of this compact is, that, in virtue of Christ's satisfaction and of our incorporation with Christ, and our reconciliation with God through faith and penance, not only are our sins effaced, but we are moreover made heirs of eternal life, and receive a title, provided we run and fight legitimately, to the crown of justice, and to the many and rich rewards, by which the

elect themselves shall be distinguished one from another; for not even “*a draught of cold water*” given to the poor “*shall go without reward*,” since God, in virtue of the contract, crowns in us what is purely his own gift. Were it otherwise, we should be but “unprofitable servants,” who have done only what we were bound to do; nor could we allege any merit, or claim any reward.

A further question has been raised, whether the regenerate can, with the aid of Divine grace, fulfil the law of God so perfectly as not to commit any mortal sin to which, of its own nature, eternal death is due. With reference to this question, as we must firmly hold that no wise legislator will prescribe impossibilities, we must also hold as certain, that to a man who has been reconciled with God, there is never wanting sufficient assistance on God’s part, and that he always possesses a power of fulfilling, provided he will it himself, not only each, but all, the precepts of the Divine law. For Christ has declared that “*his yoke is sweet and his burden light*,” and the possibility of fulfilling the law follows clearly from the fact, that the whole law requires on our part nothing more than seriously and sincerely to exert our will, and to love God with all our strength; nor do I see what there is that should render this love impossible to us, whereas even the innate idea which we have of God leads us to acknowledge his infinite loveliness; and the imperfection and unworthiness of all other objects are easily discovered by those who examine them.

It must be confessed, however, that, amid the weakness and rebellion of the flesh and the manifold distractions which surround us, it is difficult always to preserve purity of mind; and that, in consequence, few individuals have lived exempt from mortal, and none from venial, errors. And indeed, were God to enter into judgment even with one who, after regeneration, had lived exempt from mortal sin, even such a man would have no defence against its rigour except in the satisfaction of Christ; for at the least, it was in consideration of this satisfaction that he received pardon of his past sins in the first instance; and if, since that pardon, he has lived a holy life, to what else does he owe it but to the Divine assistance, for which he is indebted to the merits of Christ? Hence no one should “*glory save in the Lord*,” with whom “*we can do all things*” and whose power is strong in the weak.

Having explained the reconciliation and renovation of man, and the fruits of the new life (which are the good works prescribed, by the law of God), it remains to consider the positive enactments which Christ has instituted and prescribed, in addition to the common, natural, and perpetual law of God.

We must recollect, therefore, that Christ is not only our Mediator, who by his merit and his passion has atoned for us and reconciled us to God, but also our Legislator, who, in virtue of the “all power given to Him in heaven and on earth,” has prescribed certain laws which cannot be despised without peril of salvation, while their observance will avail very much thereto. To this number, however, do not belong, as some persons imagine, the precept of bearing injuries, of loving our enemies, and other duties of the same kind. For the love of enemies had been long before prescribed by the moral law. Nor does this precept forbid us to repress and punish the wicked, and to take such measures as may either ensure their correction, or, at least, may deprive them of the power of injuring; on the contrary, indeed, even charity to others prescribes this; and though we ought to love all, not even our enemies excepted, yet, in a case of conflicting interests, we should observe a certain proportion in dispensing our benefits. Hence the passage in which it is said that we should bear with injuries, is to be regarded either as a counsel for those who select a life of seclusion and of special perfection and patience; or it signifies that we are not to resist a magistrate,

even though he be a bad one; or it merely prohibits a desire of revenge, so that whatever is done against the wicked may be understood to be done solely from a motive of charity. The principles, therefore, of the Anabaptists, who interdict every pious man from public office and from military service, are grievously erroneous, and calculated to upturn human society; for who does not see that, if this principle were admitted, the service of the state would be deserted by good men, and that the supreme power would be thrown into the hands of its most abandoned members?

The institutions of Christ in his character of Legislator consist in the mode of Divine worship which is peculiar to Christians, and the Sacraments of the new law. Of the Sacraments we shall speak hereafter.

The distinctive character of Divine worship among Christians consists in our adoring in Christ-Man the almighty and eternal God, in our invoking Christ as the Mediator of salvation, and offering to God himself a perpetual Sacrifice of propitiation, viz. the Body and Blood of the Lord under the appearance of bread and wine, according to the order of Melchisedec, who prefigured Christ, the eternal Priest (the discussion of which subject we shall defer till we shall be considering the question of the Eucharist). To these may be subjoined the ceremonial observances which the Church has added for the sake of order and decency, and the practices connected with the veneration of the images and relics of saints, which partake somewhat of the nature of religious worship, and which, if freed from superstition and abuse, are not without their utility. Of these we shall proceed to speak under distinct heads.

As regards the worship of our Saviour, Paul has expressly declared that “*in the name of Jesus*” all men, and in all places, “*should bend the knee;*” whence all Christians, not even excepting Socinians, agree that Christ is to be adored. Now the Catholic Church rightly teaches that, unless Christ were God, He could not be adored without idolatry; nor are Divine honours due to Him at all, except on account of the Divinity. For the sentence of the all-powerful and jealous God is fixed and unalterable: “*I will not give my glory to another.*” Hence I cannot assent to the opinion of those who think that the right of Divine honour has been communicated to Christ’s Humanity in itself; an opinion defended not only by Socinians, but what is more surprising, by others also, misled by their principles regarding the “communication of properties.” Catholic teachers, however, with much more propriety, define that, although the highest perfection and the highest honour of which a creature is susceptible have been communicated to the Humanity by the Divinity, yet to the former, considered in itself, neither the properties nor the honours of the Divinity belong.

And this principle should be carefully observed, even for the sake of its practical bearing, lest, from the consideration of the supreme and eternal Good, men’s minds may be withdrawn to the worship of man; and the Jews and Mahometans may thus be confirmed in the false opinion which they have conceived regarding us, as if we adored aught else but the one Almighty God. It was this false belief that gave rise to the fable, that the God of the Christians was given in pledge in the Host to one of the Sultans of Egypt; and to the bitter sarcasm of the Arabian philosopher, who declared, that “he had seen and heard of many ridiculous religions, but none more silly than the Christian, which commanded that its God should be eaten;” — a calumny which arose either from their hatred, or from the imprudence of members of our own religion.

Nor can we regard the imperfect information of the people on this point, arising from the negligence of their teachers, as free from positive danger. For as the highest act of piety is that of the love of God above all things, derived from the consideration

of the perfection, goodness, and loveliness of his Divinity, in the possession of which the chief happiness of the soul consists, it is necessary to beware, lest, while we think we are eliciting an act of contrition and of Divine love, we stop short of this act, and rest our thoughts in the love and veneration of Christ's Humanity alone; for although, in exciting the soul to increased fervour in acknowledging the Divine wisdom, justice, and goodness, as they are manifested in Christ, the consideration of his Humanity is more efficacious than that of all other creatures beside, yet it should hold the place but of a step, and not the highest and crowning point, in the worship of God. And yet this is a fault into which we commonly see preachers and writers fall, rather labouring in their words or writings to inflame the devotion of the people, by pandering to the imagination and to a certain sensual affection of the carnal mind, than seeking to inculcate the adoration of the invisible Deity, which consists "in spirit and in truth" and is the last and highest object of our worship. However, as the whole Christ, God and Man, is the object of adoration, there is no doubt that both his most holy Soul and his most sacred Body are adored, not in themselves, but in virtue of their union with the Divinity, and in so far as the honour paid to them is resolved into that of the Divinity. And, to sum up in a few words, as it is the person which is thus honoured, the act of adoration is directed to the Person of Christ; nor are we to imagine two adorations, but one only, which is directed to the whole Lord, the ultimate reason of which, however, is to be deduced from the Divine Nature. And hence it was that the Council of Ephesus (chap. 8) decreed that Emmanuel "should be venerated with one supplication, and that one glory should be rendered to Him."

Nevertheless, I do not agree with those who, forgetful of human weakness, reject, under pretence of the "*adoration in spirit and in truth*," every thing that strikes the senses and excites the imagination. For every one who seriously considers the nature of our mind as it exists in this body, will easily admit that, although we can form, within the mind, ideas of things which are outside of the sphere of sense, yet we are unable, notwithstanding, to fix our thoughts upon them, and to dwell on them with attention, unless there be superadded to the internal idea certain sensible signs, such as words, characters, representations, likenesses, examples, associations, or effects. The utility of these notes and memorials is proportioned to their greater significancy, and their greater power of representing the properties of the thing which they are intended to denote, especially if they be prominent and striking; — and it is even of advantage if they be of their own nature pleasing. They should be divested, however, of all superfluous ornaments, and of every thing which distracts rather than assists the mind. All these principles may be illustrated by the example of a manuscript, and they are equally applicable to the style of the author, and to the character of the scribe. Thus, in addition to an accurate exposition and delineation of his subject, an author may employ, not without advantage and credit, similes, examples, apothegms, nay even musical construction and harmonious cadence: but, on the contrary, bombastic expressions, pedantic words, elaborate rhythmical arrangement, every species of affectation, and, in a word, every thing that does not soothe with insensible pleasure, but turns the mind away from the consideration of the subject to the examination of these secondary things themselves, — all such things are unworthy of an orator who seeks to persuade the hearers or readers, and are only suited to the unsubstantial rhetorician, who declaims idly in the school to please the ear, and whose praise is not effective speaking, but a skilful display of figures. So also, from a scribe or a printer we look for clean and elegant paper, enduring ink, letters distinct, well turned, and flowing with a certain appearance of ease; but we do not desire figured paper, particoloured inks, and fantastic mazes of idle flourishes, running every where

through the page; for all these things disturb and distract the reader. It is the same in sacred things: whatever leads the mind most effectually to the consideration of God's greatness and goodness, whatever excites our attention, produces pious thoughts, nay, whatever renders devotion sweet and grateful, all this is deserving of approval: but if the speaker betray excessive labour; if the hearers be carried away rather to admire his purity of diction, his elegance of gesture, and his erudition, than to love God, to confess their sins, and to amend their life; if it be the orator, rather than Christ, that is presented to the mind; if theatrical display take the place of the beauty of holy things; if the sacred music be designed rather to please the ears than to excite pious desires, — all this is to corrupt sincere devotion by profane ornaments.

Hence I am of opinion that God does not disregard, as unworthy of his service, the use of musical instruments, nor vocal harmony, nor beautiful hymns, nor sacred eloquence, nor lights, nor incense, nor precious vestments, jewelled vases, or other offerings; nor statues or graven images of pious objects; nor the laws of architecture and perspective, nor public processions, the chiming of bells, the strewing the streets with carpets, and the other expedients which the overflowing piety of the people has devised for the Divine honour, and which certain people, in their morose simplicity, despise. And this may be proved by arguments, as well as by examples. For the first fruits, and, so to speak, the choicest flowers, of all things and of all arts are due to God. Of old, even in the very infancy of the art, it was believed, as it must even still be acknowledged, that poetry (which is but a more divine species of eloquence, and, as it were, a language of angels,) could not be more nobly employed than in singing hymns, and in celebrating the praises of God with all the elegance of which it was susceptible. We must admit the same of music — the twin-sister of poetry; nor can the most eminent architects more suitably display their art, or the mightiest princes their magnificence, than in constructing and procuring the construction of temples or basilics, and other works destined to the honour of God and the purposes of piety. In the Holy Scripture we have the example of God himself; for it was in obedience to his commands that Moses constructed the tabernacle, and Solomon the temple; and we read that David employed choirs, hymns, organs, and cymbals, in the praises of God. And although there is no temple more worthy of God than a pure mind, no music sweeter than fervent prayer, no incense more grateful than the odour of sanctity, no offering more noble than alms-deeds; and although “well-ordered justice and righteousness of soul” are commended, even by a profane writer, as more precious than gold in religious worship; yet we are not to overlook external things, because they are less to be prized than internal; in the same way as our innate reason directs us to respect and honour friends and princes, not only by real service and by acts, but also by words, by gestures, and by every indication of love and honour. And our Lord rebuked those who were indignant because the vessel of precious unguent was poured out in his honour, as though the price had been more fitly turned to the uses of the poor. For God has given to mortals abundant means of satisfying both offices; and by the wise discipline of pious antiquity, it was ordained that of that portion of the sacred revenues which remained after the support of the clergy, part should be applied to the poor and to works of charity, and part to the erection of basilics, and other expenses of a similar nature.

The question regarding the worship of images, viz. how far it is lawful to use them in religion, and, through them, to render honour to the prototype, is of greater importance. For it certainly cannot be supposed that God would, without grave reason, have interdicted to his people all use of graven things, and have prohibited the making of images lest they might be used as idols. The ancient Church also, in the

first ages, as we learn from the Council of Elvira and from other passages of the ancients, did not admit images into the oratories, or at least not without great difficulty. At a later period, the bishops of Gaul and Germany, in the Council of Frankfort, held under Charlemagne, bitterly inveighed against the image-worshippers of the East and the second Council of Nice. And indeed, this controversy gave occasion to many wars, tumults, and revolutions in the East, and was not the least among the causes of the loss of Asia. The Jews too, and Saracens, have held the veneration which is paid to images among the other reasons of their hatred against Christians; nor can it be denied that, even at an early period, many abuses in divine worship had gained ground among the people; and that one among the causes of the success of Mahomet and his followers, was their pretended boast of restoring the worship of the one God. The partisans of the Reformation in the last century, also, found a plausible colour for their undertaking, in the very same profession.

On the other hand, the use of images in worship appears clearly to be founded on principles of utility and reason. What object have we in reading or listening to histories, but in order that the images which they represent may be painted on our memory? Now as these images are of themselves very fleeting, and are not always sufficiently distinct and clear, we should gratefully acknowledge, as a great gift of God, the arts of painting and sculpture, through whose aid we obtain enduring images, representing the objects with the utmost accuracy, vividness, and beauty; by the sight of which (in the impossibility of referring to the originals) the internal images may be renewed, and, like the impression of a seal on wax, more deeply imprinted upon the mind. And as the use of images possesses such advantages, in what circumstances, I ask, can it be more fitly introduced, than in those in which it is of greatest moment that the images impressed upon our memory should be especially lasting and vivid, that is, in the concerns of piety and of the Divine honour? And this is especially true, because, as I have observed above, the worship of God is, pre-eminently, the most fitting field for the display of all the arts and sciences, and therefore also of painting.

To one who considers these things, it must be clear beyond all doubt, that if the law of God and certain holy men chose to prohibit, at certain times and in certain places, a thing which in itself is harmless, and indeed which, if religiously practised, is eminently useful, it was solely because it might give occasion to grievous abuses, against which it was difficult to guard in those times. We must see, then, in what these abuses chiefly consist.

In the first place, therefore, before the written law was promulgated by God, and while his true worship was propagated solely by the tradition of the elders, many men came to forget the one infinite and invisible Creator of all things, and fell away into the worship of those things which were within reach of their imagination, the sun, the moon, the stars, the heaven, and the elements. By degrees, either through the ambition of tyrants, or, in some cases, through the veneration entertained for men of eminent merit, it came to pass that mortals were elevated into gods. And although there were some who worshipped one particular God as superior to all the rest, yet the superiority which they attributed to Him was not that of a being removed from the others by an infinite interval, but only that of a more excellent man among his fellow-men. Now the use of images and statues tended very much to promote this perverted worship. For in these, men had before their eyes perpetual incentives to the corrupt inclination which had gradually grown inveterate; and, by representing to themselves the dead as living, they fostered this most erroneous conception of the Divinity. And at last, when, by degrees, their superstition began to imagine that there existed, and indeed that there had actually been observed, in the statues, certain mysterious signs of the

presence and even of the interposition of the gods, which the interested priests circulated or exaggerated through the desire of gain, they came thence to think that there dwelt in the statues themselves some peculiar virtue of the Divinity.

To these corruptions of the Gentiles, the patriarchs, who remained true to the worship of the invisible Substance, strenuously opposed themselves. One of these, Abraham, bound himself by a peculiar treaty to the true God, and by this religious rite happily secured the fidelity of his posterity. Certainly, it was chiefly through those races which are regarded as descendants of Abraham that the worship of the one God was preserved, and was by degrees again diffused among the other nations. And when Israel, who was the grandson of Abraham, was driven by famine to go down into Egypt, and the Israelites had multiplied there, it pleased God, lest their constancy should be gradually undermined by the contagious influence of this most superstitious nation, to lead forth his chosen people with a strong hand from the slavery of Pharaoh, and to give them new laws through the mouth of Moses; one of which interdicted them from all use, or at least all sacred use, of images, in order that they might the better be preserved pure from idol-worship, which was then almost universally received. Perhaps the same reason continued in force among the early Christians; and in the designs of God and of the holy men of that age, it seemed more safe to lean to the opposite side, and to dispense altogether with a matter which in itself is good and useful, but still is unessential, than to expose souls yet tender and ill confirmed in the faith, to danger of idolatry.

And hence, if there existed, even at the present day, great reason for caution, and a fear that their use would lead to idolatry, I doubt not that it might be right to deal with images, as Ezechias did with the brazen serpent, though this had been set up by the order of God himself. In the same way, also, it would be advisable to abstain from introducing them among a people who would, perhaps, be deterred from embracing Christianity by their detestation of images; — a contingency which may yet arise, among the Arabs, the Persians, the Scythians, and the other nations of the East, if it shall please God to favour the arms, or rather the preaching, of the Christians, and to bring on the fatal day of the Mahometan domination.

Hence, when all the reasons are carefully balanced, we must come to the conclusion, that the law of God, if any such law existed, against the use of images, and even against such a worship of them as does not trench in any way upon the Divine honour, was merely a ceremonial precept; that it was but temporary in its nature, and perhaps was retained for a while by the first Christians, on account of grave reasons; — in the same way as the law of the Sabbath-day, and that concerning the use of "*blood and things strangled*," which, though enforced by a much more express passage of the New Testament, nevertheless fell into disuse among the majority of Christians, as soon as the reason for observing them was at an end.

Indeed, there are examples which prove that it admitted of dispensation, even among the Jews; for although the law appears utterly to prohibit images and graven things, yet (not to speak of likenesses of inanimate objects) we read of the golden cherubim and the brazen serpent which were constructed by Moses; and of other cherubim, and oxen, and lions, which were made by Solomon, and, for the most part, were set up even in the holy place, some of which were expressly ordered, and others at least approved. And although it appears more probable that, in the origin of Christianity, there were no images in the oratories, or very few, (for we find mention in Tertullian of one image of Christ, under the form of The Good Shepherd seeking the Lost Sheep, graven on the sacred chalices,) yet it cannot be denied that they were gradually received into use; and St. Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, describes a picture of

the sufferings of a certain martyr, as elaborately painted on the wall of a temple: — to pass over other testimonies for the present.

But as regards the actual veneration of images, it cannot be denied that, through fear of superstition, Christians long abstained therefrom, especially as long as pagans were still intermingled with them in considerable numbers. But when the worship of demons was at last exploded throughout the greatest part of the known and civilised world, and when the gods had ceased to be mentioned except in jest, even grave men no longer saw cause why images, which are the alphabet of the unlearned, and which to the simple people supply a great incentive to piety, should be excluded from worship.

Nevertheless, the iconoclast contests in the East, and the opposition of the fathers of Frankfort, shew that opinion long continued to fluctuate; and even St. Gregory, surnamed the Great, the Pontiff of the Roman Church, who lived still earlier than these, appears to have varied in his sentiments. For, in a letter to Serenus, Bishop of Marseilles, he approves of his having forbidden the adoration of images, and, at the same time, rebukes him for having broken them. And yet, writing to one Secundinus, to whom he had sent an image of the Saviour, he says: “We do not prostrate ourselves before it as before a Divinity, but we adore Him, of whom we are reminded by the image that He was born, or that He suffered, and that now He sitteth upon the throne.” Now this proves, not obscurely, that Gregory was wont to adore Christ in presence of an image, or turned toward an image. And this, as I shall state hereafter, is precisely what others call adoration of images. And thus Gregory appears, in order to avoid scandal, to have accommodated himself to those to whom he wrote, in a matter which he deemed of itself indifferent; for the practice of venerating images came but tardily into use in Gaul, and was much earlier in the East and in Italy. And a priest, named Claudius, who was sent from Gaul into Italy, by Louis the Pious, and was made Bishop of Turin on account of his learning, relates that he incurred danger by resisting the worship of images, as appears from the work of Jonas of Orleans, who wrote a refutation of his doctrine. The reason of this difference, I think, may be deduced from the different genius of the nations; for the inhabitants of the latter countries have always been of a more vivid imagination, and therefore more given to ceremonies. Whence we find that they paid to the statues of Emperors and Kings the same honours as to the prince in person — a thing almost unknown in Gaul and Germany. It is not strange, therefore, that those nations should regard with horror, as a sacrilege, the denial in other countries of that honour which they themselves pay to the images of Christ and the Saints, (though this may sometimes have been from a good and laudable zeal); because they see the prototype present, as it were, in the image; for they pursue the associations to a greater length in their mind, and therefore their imagination is more delicate and exquisite. And yet the same nations, when imbued with the contrary opinion, may fall into excess on the opposite side; as, for instance, we find that the Mahometans cannot tolerate pictures of living things even in profane use. By degrees, however, Gaul and Germany, and almost the whole Christian world, followed the example of the East and Italy, and continued so to do until the changes of the last century.

But before we lay down the principles which are to be held regarding the received worship of images, we must see in what it consists; and this we cannot ascertain better than from the words of the Council of Trent, which run thus: “Moreover [let the bishops teach] that the images of Christ, of the Virgin Mother of God, and the other Saints, are to be had and retained, especially in temples, and due honour and veneration paid to them: not that we believe that there is in them any divinity or virtue

on account of which they are to be worshipped, or that any thing is to be asked from them, or that trust is to be placed in them, as was done of old by the Gentiles, who *'placed their hope in idols;'* but because the honour which is shewn them is referred to the originals which they represent: so that, through the images which we kiss, and before which we bare the head and prostrate ourselves, we but adore Christ and venerate the Saints, whose likeness they bear."

The decree subjoins, that "through the histories of the mysteries of our redemption, as expressed by pictures or other representations, the people are instructed, and are strengthened in recalling and assiduously meditating on the articles of faith; and furthermore, that great fruit is derived from all images, not only because they recall to the minds of the people the benefits and gifts which they have received from Christ, but also because by them the wonders of God, wrought through the Saints, and their saying examples, are set before the eyes of the faithful; to the end that they may give thanks to God for them, that they may compose their lives and morals to the imitation of the Saints, and may be excited to adore and love God, and to cherish piety." In these words of the Council I do not see what it is possible to censure. And it is afterwards added, that "the holy synod anxiously desires the suppression of the abuses which have crept in."

But, to discuss the matter more distinctly, we must reflect, that the honour paid to images is of two kinds: the first, the honour which properly belongs to the image itself, as its being set in a prominent and honourable place, adorned, set off with lights, carried in procession; — and this honour, I think, presents but little difficulty, and will easily be tolerated by any one who does not think that images are to be rejected altogether: — the second, which is referred to the original, and which demands more diligent examination; and this is the veneration of images regarding which the controversy arises. Such, for instance, is the act of men kissing an image, bowing the head before it, bending the knee, prostrating, pouring forth prayers, making vows, offering praises, or giving thanks. But indeed, although by the established use of language, the honour is said to be, in such case, paid to the image, yet in reality, in the sense in which the Council explains the honour to be rendered to images, the object to which the honour is referred is not the thing, which is inanimate and incapable of honour, but the original, in the presence of the image, or through the image. And hence it was, I suppose, that some scholastics maintained that the adoration paid to the image of Christ is the same supreme worship of *Latria* as that of the Lord Christ himself. For this act which is called adoration of the image, is in reality but adoration of Christ himself, suggested by occasion, and in consideration, of the image, to which the body is turned as to Christ himself, in order that his presence may be presented more forcibly, and the mind may be more sensibly elevated to the contemplation of the Lord. For no man in his senses will intend to say, "O image, grant my petition!" "To thee, O marble!" or "O stone, I give thanks!" but "*Thee, O Lord, I adore! to Thee I sing praises!*" In these times, nevertheless, it would seem to be useful, and conducive to piety, to abstain, for the purpose of avoiding scandal, from all those expressions of the scholastics which convey that an image is to be revered with the Divine honour of *Latvia*; phrases which the Council has prudently avoided, and of which it sufficiently conveys its disapproval.

Supposing, therefore, that no other species of veneration of images is admitted than simply the veneration of the original in presence of the image, there will no more be idolatry in this practice, than in the veneration which is shewn to God and to Christ, when his most sacred name is pronounced. For names, too, are signs, and, indeed, far inferior to images in significancy; for they are much less perfect representations of the

object. When an image, therefore, is said to be honoured, the act should not be understood in any other sense than when it is said that “*in the name of Jesus the knee is bowed,*” that “*the name of the Lord is blessed,*” that “*glory is given to his name*” And it is not a whit more censurable to adore before an external image, than it is to adore in presence of the internal image which is painted on our imagination; for the only use of the external image is to render the internal one more vivid.

The Council wisely cautions us not to believe that any “virtue or divinity exists and dwells in the image itself a superstitious belief similar to that of the Trojans, who thought that the city would fall, if the Palladium were taken away; and of the Romans, who used a set form of words in order to call out the gods from the enemies’ temples, and believed that the god himself was transferred along with the image; and of some among the Gentiles, who were convinced that carrying the statue of a particular god in procession would ensure success: of which superstitions concerning images, the Arabs still retain a trace in certain figures and talismans; and the Jews, in certain written or spoken names; which undoubtedly implies an adoration of the images or of the names.

No less wisely did the Council add, that “neither is trust to be placed in images;” as if, for example, devotion would be less grateful to God, or prayers less efficacious, if the image chanced to be removed, or lost, or changed; which is certainly a superstitious belief. And we must maintain in like manner regarding relics, that their loss or even their spuriousness, would not prejudice the prayer of the suppliants, provided their piety continued the same. For we must also hold, that visits undertaken, either voluntarily or from vow, to certain places of especial sanctity, and other similar works, are sometimes profitable to piety; for even the very journey and the other details of the undertaking form part of the honour; and the discipline of soul, the penance and obligation voluntarily undertaken, the peculiar manifestation of fervour and zeal, and the union of our private tribute to God’s honour with the public expression of the piety of the assembled people, are all acts worthy of commendation; — and the very place itself, signalised by divine favours, moves the mind more forcibly by its memories and associations, and strikes it with a kind of holy awe; as I remember even Protestants, who had had the happy privilege of visiting our Lord’s sepulchre, to have admitted.

The same grace, nevertheless, will be obtained in any other place where the same lively faith and the same devotion of soul are found, even though the images, relics, and similar external helps be wanting; for such things have not their efficacy, so to speak, from the rite itself (*ex opere operato*), like the Sacraments, but from the disposition of the subject (*ex opere operantis*), as the schoolmen say. And therefore, as the observance of certain times as peculiarly holy, is profitable solely because it excites to piety by a kind of special admonition, it is the same with the reverence of particular places, and the rites performed, or the objects preserved, therein. No person, therefore, who approves of the distinction of seasons and of the observances peculiar to them, is justified in condemning the distinction of places, and of the sacred objects preserved in them; nor is there any greater reason, therefore, for rejecting sacred pilgrimages, than festival-days.

Besides, I do not see what evil there can be in bowing down before an image of the crucifix, and, while we look upon it, honouring Him it represents; whereas, on the other hand, its advantages are manifest, inasmuch as it is certain that it has a wondrous effect in exciting the affections. We have already seen that such was the practice of Saint Gregory the Great; nor are the followers of the Augsburg Confession entirely averse to it. And indeed, if it were not certain that there existed in former

times grievous abuses of images, which have cast suspicion on a practice excellent in itself, and if we did not actually know what contests, both in ancient and modern times, have arisen concerning it, perhaps it would not be easy for any one to suspect any hidden evil or danger, or even any cause of scruple, in the practice of worshipping in presence of an image; — so innocent, nay so correct and laudable does this practice in itself appear.

It is commonly objected, indeed, that the pagans used the same qualification; professing that it was not the marble or wood, but the gods, that they worshipped. But in addition to their attributing a virtue to the images, and reposing confidence in them, we have already anticipated this objection by shewing, that the reason why image-worship is bad, and why it was prohibited of old, is not because of its own intrinsic evil, but because it inclined to the worship of false gods; for (from the received use of the word) that only is really idolatrous, which transfers to another the honour due to God. Now in the Church at the present day, all the honour paid to images is referred solely to those originals, through which we venerate that one and eternal Deity, to whom alone we have been taught to pay divine honours, and whose benefits we contemplate in others, in order that, admonished the more thereby, we may terminate our worship in Himself.

I see one plausible objection; namely, that it is safer to abstain from a practice which is at all doubtful. Now to this I say, that if the doubt be trivial, the conscience which is thereby troubled is a scrupulous one. I admit, indeed, that in the present dispositions of many among Protestants, (to say nothing of Jews and Mahometans,) much offence arises from the use of images; but, on the other hand, it must be considered what tumults and scandals, what rivers of blood, would be necessary, in order to eliminate from the Church this usage, which in itself, and apart from abuses and scandals on both sides, is a most excellent and praiseworthy one. Justly, therefore, has it been decreed that it should be retained. Nor can its retention afford to any one a just cause of separation. Nor is it to be believed that “*the gates of hell*” have so far “*prevailed against the Church*” and against the assistance which Christ promised to her, that, for so many ages, a damnable form of idolatry should have been established over the entire Christian world.

All things considered, therefore, seeing that in the practice of venerating images, as it is approved by the Fathers of Trent, there is nothing opposed to the divine honour that there does not appear to be, in these times, when all are sufficiently aware that the Omnipotent Deity alone is worshipped with divine honour, any fear of idolatry, which might pervert the honour due to God; that, moreover, there exists in the Church a usage of so many centuries, which cannot be abolished without the greatest revolutions; that, in fine, if the abuses be removed, it is productive of signal advantage to piety; I conclude that the retention of the practice of venerating the original in the presence of the image (in which alone image-worship consists) is a judicious and pious measure, provided it is confined strictly within its own limits, and the utmost caution is observed in its use. Care, however, must be taken to teach the people to think and speak correctly on a matter which is connected with the divine honour; and to avoid every thing which may be productive of scandal, and may have the effect of alienating men’s minds more and more from the unity of the Church, or of deterring those who are disposed to return.

I will mention an instance which I myself remember. A soldier, who had deserted from the ranks, was condemned to be hanged; and when he was brought in sight of the gallows, and was in momentary expectation of the final sentence of pardon or of death from the Protestant prince in whose service he was, fluctuating as he was

between fear and hope, he bathed with his tears a little silver image of the crucifix. But, on the arrival of the happy news, he exulted with joy, and, printing kisses on the image, exclaimed, "'Tis to thee I owe my safety. 'Tis thou that hast snatched me from the jaws of death. 'Tis thou that hast delivered me!" So far, his language was correct. But when one of the bystanders, a man of rank, (and they were almost all Protestants,) added, as if calling his attention to what he had said, "Surely you do not mean this figure of Christ which you hold in your hand, but the Christ who suffered for us?"

"Yes," said he, redoubling his kisses; "it was this one also;"— "*Et cettuy-cy aussi*" for he was a Frenchman. These words were heard with great horror by the bystanders; as if there were two Saviours, one the living Christ, the other the silver one; and one of them assured me that the hideousness of the papistic idolomania (for thus they speak in their unhappy misconception) had never appeared more clear to him. For my part, I think that this poor wretch, in his agitation of mind, did not sufficiently reflect on the words which he was using; and that the crime was in his language, rather than in his mind. Still, it is of great importance that these expressions should be carefully examined, in order that the people may be duly instructed.

And as there are Protestants who do not find in image-worship any just cause for severing the unity of the Church, so there are, on the other hand, learned Catholics who are of opinion, that if Protestants, and, in general, the nations which know not, or reject, this worship, should persist, through some inveterate repugnance, in declining to adopt it, they might, nevertheless, be received into the bosom of the Church; provided they manifested good dispositions in every other respect, evinced a readiness to receive instruction, and admitted, meanwhile, that Catholics are not to be condemned on account of the practice. For in such things as these, which are neither necessary in themselves, nor expressly prescribed by Divine law, some allowance must be made for men's inclination and for custom, in order to avoid the scandal of weak brethren.

The question of Saints and of Relics is connected with that of images; and much of what we have said concerning images is equally applicable to this subject. And, as a general principle, we must hold, that neither the act of adoring in presence of an image, nor the worship of Saints or of relics, is approved, except in so far as they are referred to God; and that no act of religion is allowable, which may not be resolved into the honour of the one Almighty God, and does not terminate therein. When the Saints are honoured, therefore, the honour should be understood in the sense in which it is said in Scripture, "Thy friends are honoured, O God!" and "Praise ye the Lord in his Saints" And when the Saints are invoked, and their aid implored, their aid must always be understood to consist in the prayers which they pour forth with great efficacy in our behalf; as Bellarmine has observed, that "Help me, O Peter, or O Paul!" is to be regarded as signifying nothing more than "Pray for me!" or "Help me by interceding for me!"

It is certain, indeed, that Angel-guardians are assigned to us by God. Now the Scripture compares the Saints to Angels, and calls them "equal to Angels" (ισαγγελους).

That the Saints have some concern in human affairs, appears to be conveyed by the "*talking of Moses and Elias with Christ*;" and that even particular events come to the knowledge of the Saints and Angels, (whether it be in the mirror of the Divine vision, or by the natural clearness and wide-ranging powers of vision possessed by the glorified mind,) is insinuated in Christ's declaration, that there is "*joy in heaven upon*

one sinner that doth penance” Further, that God, in consideration of the Saints, even after their death, grants favours to men (although it is only through Christ that the Saints, whether of the Old or of the New Testament, possess their dignity), is indicated by the prayers found in the Scripture: “*Remember, O Lord, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, thy servants!*” a form not very different from that which the Church commonly employs: “Grant, O Lord, that we may be assisted by the merits and intercession of thy Saints!” that is, “Regard their labours, which, by thy gift, they have borne for thy name; hear their prayers, to which thy only-begotten Son hath given efficacy and value!”

Some persons raise a question as to the manner in which the Saints can have a knowledge of human affairs; and St. Augustine himself seems to have hesitated and entertained some doubt regarding it. But, for my part, I do not think it consistent with truth to suppose that these most holy souls are shut up in a place where, it is true, they are in the enjoyment of delights, but are ignorant of the events which are passing, or if they obtain some casual knowledge of them, obtain it solely through the intervention of the angels. Because knowledge is the source of the highest pleasures of the mind; and as the souls of the Blessed contemplate more closely the Divine wisdom and perfection, it is reasonable to suppose that they are now admitted more intimately to the secrets of Providence, which, while in the flesh, they admired from afar; and that they now know the infinite justice of God’s government, which heretofore they but believed; and this, I think, cannot be conceived without supposing them to be cognisant of the particular events that pass among men. Many are inclined to think that it is in the mirror of the Divine vision the Angels and Saints see all things. However, if you consider the matter accurately, it will be seen that, even now, God is the sole immediate object of the mind, outside of the mind itself; and that it is only through the medium of God our ideas represent to us what passes in the world; for on no other supposition can it be conceived how the body can act on the soul, or how different created substances can communicate with one another. Nay, we should be aware that, in every state of existence, our mind is a mirror of God and of the universe; with this difference, that, in the present state, our view is clouded, and our knowledge confused. When, therefore, this cloud shall be withdrawn, and when God shall manifest Himself more clearly, we shall see God face to face, and we shall see all other things (as we do even now) in Him as the medium; but we shall see them far more clearly, distinctly, and comprehensively, than we see them now; partly by the very nature of the mind in its glorified state, partly by an especial grace of God.

Nor should any one wonder at the possibility of an Angel or Blessed Soul’s seeing at a single view the affairs of Asia and of Europe, and, while he embraces so vast a range, penetrating, nevertheless, even into its minutest parts. Let us but reflect how many objects the general of an army, placed on an eminence, reviewing his forces or disposing his line, sees at the same time. Now, if it be considered that the glorified mind’s powers of vision are enlarged in the same proportion as our universe is greater than the plain, all wonder will be at an end. If the vision is extended more than a thousand-fold by the use of telescopes and microscopes, shall we doubt that God can grant to the Blessed much more than Galileo or Drebel has given to us? You will tell me, indeed, that these instruments do not admit of our seeing many things distinctly together, and that in proportion as the field of the tube is increased, its power is diminished. It is so, I confess; because in this case the assistance is given to the eyes, which are restricted within certain dimensions; but in the other case God increases the power of the mind, which has no defined and immovable limits. We know that a tribune, or, at all events, a centurion, can have his soldiers drawn out and disposed so

perfectly under his view, that not a motion of theirs escapes him. And to how many objects does the chess-player apply his mind by one glance! As the mind, therefore, is capable of considering many objects distinctly at the same time, there is nothing to prevent the number of objects being increased in many thousand ways, without affecting the distinctness of the knowledge. And perhaps the ratio of the number of the remarkable occurrences among the entire human race, to that of the variations which a scientific chess-player has to consider together, is much less than the ratio which the glorified mind bears to ours. For, even here on earth, we see what a vast difference, in applying the mind to many different things together, there is between an unskilled and a practised man; and we might almost consider miraculous (though we, nevertheless, find it true,) the readiness with which some persons can perform the longest calculations by a purely mental act, so as to appear to read them from a manuscript; and can retain innumerable images of the fancy so perfectly under view, as to be able to select in an instant the particular one which may be required.

From reasons, however, let us come to examples and authority. It is certain that, even in the second age of the Christian Church, the natal days of the martyrs were celebrated; that religious meetings at their monuments were instituted; and that the prayers of Saints were believed to be profitable. For Origen, a writer of the third century (Num. c. xxxi.), asks, “Who doubts that the Saints assist us by their prayers, and confirm and exhort us by the example of their actions?” He speaks of the opinion, therefore, as a thing thoroughly ascertained and received in his times. And Origen himself (in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans) seems, in his own private judgment, to have inclined to the opinion, that the Blessed assist us, not only, as is the received belief of the Church, by intercession, but also by actual interposition, like the Angels. However, he speaks doubtingly, and says, that, if the opinion be true, “it must be numbered among the hidden mysteries which may not be committed to paper — a caution, perhaps, which he thought necessary in order to avoid superstition. St. Cyprian commended himself to the living, praying them to remember him after their death (B. 1. Epist. I). And if, as some persons think, no examples of the invocation of Saints, in the same way as of image-worship, can be found in those times, the answer must be, that, previous to the extirpation of idolatry by Constantine, the Church carefully avoided every thing which, even though in itself harmless, could, by any means, be distorted into a confirmation of the Gentile superstitions. At all events, it appears from St. Basil the Great and St. Gregory Nazianzen, that, in the fourth century, the invocation of martyrs by name, and the belief of their power to assist us, was already received. St. Gregory of Nyssa says, that “supplications are offered to a martyr, to become, as it were, our ambassador with God.” And St. Ambrose, in the book *On Widows*, after observing that Peter and Andrew prayed our Lord for Simon’s mother-in-law, who was sick of fever, says, that “one who is subject to great sins, acts wisely in employing others to intercede with the physician in his behalf;” and that “Angels and martyrs are to be invoked.”

Now, if it be an act of idolatry, or, at all events, a damnable worship, to address Angels and Saints, and solicit their intercession in our behalf with God, I do not see how Basil, and Nazianzen, and Ambrose, and others, who have hitherto been accounted Saints, can be excused from idolatry, or, at least, from the foulest abomination. For these practices will not be what are commonly called blemishes of the Fathers, but great and manifest crimes. And there is reason to dread lest views like these may open a way for the subversion of the whole Christian faith. For if it be true that, even from this early period, such horrible errors prevailed in the Church, the fact will furnish a strong argument for the cause of the Arians and Samosatensians, who

date the origin of error from these very times, and insinuate that the mystery of the Trinity and the practice of idolatry were simultaneously introduced. Thus the authority of the early Councils is destroyed; and, as we must admit that the most Holy Trinity is not so clearly proved from Sacred Scripture, as that we can satisfy every doubt if we set the authority of the Church aside, I leave each one to form his judgment as to where the matter will end. Nay, more daring spirits will carry suspicion farther; for they will wonder how Christ, who was so prodigal of promises to His Church, should have, nevertheless, indulged the enemy of the human race, so far as to permit that, after one species of idolatry had been exploded, another should take its place; and that, while we see the Jewish and Mahometan religions continue, for so many ages, to maintain incorrupt in a sufficient degree the original constitution of their founders, yet, out of the sixteen centuries of Christianity, there are scarcely one or two during which the true faith was in any degree preserved among Christians. What then will become of the counsel of Gamaliel, who advised that the Christian religion, and the will of Providence in its regard, should be judged by the issue? or what estimate are we to form of Christianity itself, if it withstand this test so badly?

Nevertheless, I do not therefore deny that there had crept in commonly in the Church abuses, and these too of a sufficiently grievous nature, which in after times degenerated into dangerous superstition. Thus St. Epiphanius (whom we also find removing from a temple an image which was painted upon the veil, lest it should lead to abuse,) inveighs vehemently against the Collyridians and others, who paid excessive honours to the Mother of God and the other Saints. In our own times too, grave complaints have emanated from bishops, not only of France and Belgium, but also of Spain and Italy, and from other eminent men. And even the Council of Trent prudently ordained that the abuses should be checked; and that not merely for formsake, as some writers maliciously assert, but seriously, and not without success. For many salutary measures have been passed in the congregations of the Cardinals, with the view of restraining the levity and superstition of certain individuals; and several admirable bulls have been issued by the Popes — as, for instance, Urban VIII. and Innocent XI. the former eminently distinguished for his learning, the latter for his piety, — by which many abuses have actually been abolished, or at least repressed.

Nor do I doubt that, by the zeal of the Pontiffs, the sovereign princes, and the learned and pious prelates of the Church, the greatest part of this cockle may gradually be rooted out of the field of God; for he who would seek to remove it all by one effort, should beware lest he disturb the Church and injure the wheat. In all those things which are more tolerable, we should follow the counsel of St. Augustine, who, in a letter to Januarius, complainingly avows, that “there are many things which, to avoid the scandal of some pious or turbulent persons, he does not dare to censure too freely and, in his work against Faustus the Manichee, he observes that, “what we teach is one thing, what we bear another; one thing, what we are ordered to prescribe, another what we are instructed to correct, and are compelled to tolerate until we shall be able to correct.” Such is the opinion of this man, no less distinguished by his prudence than by his sanctity. This, however, must be understood to mean, that we are to pay due regard to the interest and peace of the Church; and we are neither to flatter men by shameful indulgence, nor are we, on the contrary, under the influence of anger, love of contradiction, or impatience of correction, to strive after what is forbidden, and to approve what in our calm mind we should ourselves reject, solely for the purpose of annoying our adversaries, or expressing our abhorrence of them the more strongly. And, in like manner, Protestants should reflect that the truth is sacrificed by excessive altercation; that by mutual hatred men are carried into

excesses; and that the Church is not to be accused solely because she is unable to remove, by a single stroke, every thing that she seriously and severely condemns.

Nor, however, are the protestations fruitless, as the adversaries of the Church assert; for they will discover in the writings of Catholics, cautions, which, if observed, will remove all the chief causes of complaint; as, for example, where Cardinal Bellarmine writes, that whenever the aid of the Saints is asked, it must be understood “that they assist us, not of themselves, but by their intercession with God;” a qualification which should be diligently inculcated, and which, generally speaking, should be added in express words, especially in more solemn prayers. And the Bishop of Meaux, author of that golden treatise, *The Exposition of the Faith*, has given this excellent admonition, that all religious worship should terminate ultimately in God. Similar cautions may be found in the writings of others, which, for brevity-sake, I abstain from citing. I shall only advert to some which are of greater importance; as, for example, that when we pray to the Saints, we should be careful not to detract thereby from the Divine mercy. For the Psalmist says, “I will sing” not only “the justice,” but also “the mercy, of the Lord:” in one single psalm, he has repeated twenty-seven times, that “his mercy and goodness endure for ever and we are most severely forbidden to place our confidence (that is, ultimately) in men. Moreover, as mercy is among those attributes of God by which men’s affections are most conciliated, it seems inconsistent with a right love of God to deny Him mercy; nor should we tolerate, therefore, such language as that “God has reserved justice to Himself, and has given up mercy to the Blessed Virgin;” and that this was prefigured in the history of Esther, to whom Assuerus promises half his kingdom; for it is only by virtue of the Lord’s own mercy that the prayers of the Saints possess their power of profiting us. These cautions, therefore, should be carefully impressed on men’s minds; for there may be danger lest, if an erroneous impression be allowed to be formed, the simple faithful may fall away from the love of God, and from true penance and contrition.

Moreover, though we may use the intercession of Saints as a slender supplement of our devotion, yet it is necessary, at the same time, to address ourselves directly to God. For the Saints, however great they may be, are all our fellow-slaves; and the only true “*Mediator of God and man*” is Christ, who is raised as high towards the Father as the Saints are depressed to us: for they stand, as it were, at our side, or in our company, as if praying conjointly with us. And therefore their intercessions can no more come at all into comparison with the mediatorial office of Christ, than can the prayers of living Saints when united with ours; and although the prayers which are offered by the Blessed in many ways surpass those of holy persons on earth, yet, relatively to the mediation of Christ, they can no more bear any proportion, than a man, by leaping up towards the sun from the ground, can be said to have gone nearer to it.

But, in addition to this, God expressly commands, both by threats and by promises, that He should be Himself invoked. He is Himself called “*our hope*,” “*our trust*,” “*the way*,” “*the door*,” “*our strength*,” “*our aid*,” “*beside whom there is no salvation*,” “*no other helper*,” that is, none who can anywise come into account, if compared with God or with Christ. Nor should any consciousness of unworthiness on our part be deemed sufficient to repel us from the throne of grace, when our repentance is sincere. He himself invites us, when He says, “*Come to me, all you that labour, and are heavy burdened, and I will refresh you*” And, “*If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ, who is the propitiation for our sins*” And although it is a laudable act of reverence to account oneself unworthy the sight of God, and to employ

every sign of a humble mind (among which signs the employing pious men on earth, and still more the blessed in heaven, to pray with us, is one which not only should not be despised, but should be warmly commended), yet, since He himself invites us, it is our duty to obey and approach to Him; lest, instead of filial humility, there grow up a spirit of servile estrangement and distrust. Hence the admirable sentiment of Chrysostom regarding the Canaanite woman: “Behold the prudence of the woman! she asketh not James, neither entreateth she John; she goeth not to Peter, she addresseth herself not to the choir of the Apostles — that is to say, she goes not to them (for we are bound, from other passages, to put this interpretation upon Chrysostom) in such a way as to rest finally upon them, or to place her hopes in them alone; for it appears elsewhere that she was importunate with the disciples also, as even they themselves declare. Chrysostom continues: “She sought not a mediator; but, instead of all these, she took as her companion, Penance, which filled the place of an advocate, and thus went to the fountainhead.”

It is necessary, therefore, always to bear these things in mind, in order that, if the intercession of Saints be employed, it may be regarded in the light of a supplementary devotion, and of a simple mark of our reverence and humility towards God, and love for God’s friends; and that the substance of the worship may always be addressed directly to God himself.

Hence pious and prudent men are of opinion that all pains should be taken, not only to impress, by every means, upon the minds of hearers and learners, the infinite and unmeasurable difference which exists between the honour due to God and that which is shewn to the Saints (the former of which, divines, after Augustine, call *λατρεία*, the latter, *δουλεία*); but also to exhibit it, as far as possible, by external signs. For although there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite, and although it is, for this reason, impossible to find proportionate signs of both — a thing which cannot be done even in finite things, where they differ widely from each other (as we see that, in a picture, it is impossible to represent properly the true proportion of the system of the world, because the distance of the fixed stars is immeasurable), — yet, at least, we should not omit those signs which, as far as it can be done, may at least signify that the difference is the greatest that exists; and it is better to omit altogether that which, being finite, is unworthy of comparison, than so to equalise it with the Infinite and Divine, as to incur grievous danger of creating a most fatal confusion of them. And although we may not be able to be perfectly exact and scrupulous in observing this caution, yet the more secure course will be to neglect it as little as possible. It is advisable, therefore, that we should reserve certain determinate external signs for God alone; that we should not mix up indiscriminately the honour of the Saints with that of God, but should distinguish them, as far as is conveniently possible, if not in place, at least in time; and lastly, that, when it is necessary to unite them, we should frequently add words which may indicate the immense difference that subsists between them, and may declare that whatever of dignity and power the Saints possess, is all from the Divine grace and the merit of Christ, and that the mercy and goodness of God himself superabound in an endless variety of ways.

If these precautions for the security of the essentials of worship and the maintenance of the Divine honour be observed, we shall be able, with St. Augustine, to tolerate many things in the Church, which, could it prudently be done, it were better to reform hereafter; and hence the charge which imputes to the Church the idolatry of the Gentiles, is neither just nor charitable. It is true, they assert that the Gentiles also rendered to their gods a worship inferior to that of the Supreme God; and therefore, that these gods only differ from the Saints of Christians in name — the former being

called *Dii*, and the latter *Divi*. But this accusation is undoubtedly unjust. For, omitting the consideration, that (whereas it is certain that the Saints are friends of God) the *Dii* or *Indigetes* of the Gentiles were men unworthy of that honour; and that, whereas the gods of the Gentiles were worshipped not as the ministers but as the associates of Jupiter, all our worship of Angels and Saints is terminated in God, who “*hath given his Angels charge over us,*” and is moved in our favour by the prayers of the Saints; omitting, I say, these considerations, the entire matter comes to this, that the Gentiles did not sufficiently acknowledge, either in their Jupiter, or in any other of their gods, the Infinite and supremely Perfect Being; and that therefore, at least as far as appears from their public worship, all their gods, not even excepting the highest, were idols; whereas Christians, who worship with Divine honour, or *latria*, the supreme, eternal, and infinitely perfect Being, do not commit idolatry, no matter what degree of finite perfection, not trenching on the supreme honour of God, they may attribute to others; since they confess that these perfections themselves flow gratuitously from the fountain of the Divine goodness.

Seeing, therefore, that the blessed souls, in their present state, are much more intimately present in all our affairs, and see all things much more nearly, than while they lived on earth (for men are acquainted only with the few things which occur in their sight, or are reported to them by others); seeing that their charity, or desire of aiding us, is far more ardent; seeing, in fine, that their prayers are far more efficacious than those which they offered formerly in this life, that it is certain that God has granted many favours even to the intercessions of the living, and that we look for great advantage from the union of the prayers of our brethren with our own; I do not perceive how it can be made a crime to invoke a blessed soul or a holy Angel, and to beg his intercession or his assistance, according as the life and history of the martyr, or other circumstances, appear to suggest: especially if this worship is considered but as a slender accessory of that supreme worship which is immediately directed to God alone; and if, whatever may be its character, it is offered for the sake of testifying our reverence and humility towards God, and our affection for God’s servants, and springs from that pious solicitude which prompts us, in proportion to the lowly sense we entertain of our own unworthiness, to desire to unite the prayers of other pious persons, and, above all, those of the Blessed, with our own. And thus, when it is analysed, this very accessory of worship terminates in God Himself; to whose gift alone the Saints are indebted for all that they are or can do, and to whom is due a sovereign honour and love incomparably transcending all other love. For if the veneration and invocation of Saints be circumscribed within these limits, it is, though not of necessity, not alone tolerable, but praiseworthy. At all events, it cannot be regarded as idolatrous or damnable, unless we be willing to affirm, at the imminent hazard of the faith, that the promises of Christ have been frustrated, and that the true Church fell, from her very origin, into a horrible apostasy. And if, on the other hand, we admit that she has until now subsisted incorrupt against the gates of hell, we should not tear ourselves away from her communion, because she is unable, by a single stroke, to cut off abuses which she herself reprobates; nor is it possible to doubt that she will reform these abuses with greater facility when unity shall have been restored, and when, peace being established, and her attention no longer distracted by the variety of objects, her entire solicitude shall be concentrated upon the cure of her domestic evils.

It is not necessary to add much on the subject of relics. From the example of the bones of Eliseus, it is certain that God has performed miracles through their instrumentality. As we have proved, therefore, that, provided certain limits be

observed, the Saints may lawfully be venerated, it follows that it must be lawful to esteem relics also, and to take occasion from their presence, no less than from that of images, to venerate the person to whom they belong. And as it is an affair which alone depends upon pious affection, it does not matter, although the relics which are believed to be real should happen, in point of fact, to be supposititious. We must be cautious, however, lest, by imprudent devotion, we expose ourselves to ridicule, and the Church to contempt, with "*them that are without*" and we should always remember, that it is our duty to act in such a way as to shew that these accessories of piety do not unduly occupy our mind, nor divert it from the worship of the one omnipotent God, which alone is of primary and supreme importance, and in comparison of which it is better to neglect all the rest than to depart from it in any particular whatsoever.

Having completed, as far as our brief limits permitted, all that appertains to general worship, (for we shall consider, under the head of the Eucharist, the question of the Unbloody Sacrifice and the adoration of Christ's Body under the appearances of bread and wine,) we must now come to the Sacraments, which constitute a peculiar kind of worship, and consist of certain sacred rites instituted by Christ, to which a promise of grace is superadded. To this class, however, the promise made to those "*who are gathered together in the name of the Lord*" does not belong; for, as every religion involves the duty of publicly worshipping God, this promise would be understood of itself, even though it had not been expressly made. Under the name of Sacraments, we comprise certain determinate institutions.

And though it is idle to dispute much about names, yet, as the appellation 'Sacrament' has been received in the Church, its meaning should be estimated, not from private caprice, but from public usage. By the name of Sacrament, therefore, is now-a-days understood in the Church, a rite to which a special promise of grace is annexed by God. Some require, in addition, that the rite should be expressly contained and sufficiently described in Sacred Scripture; but it is certain that what is wanting in the written, can, and should be, supplied by the traditionary word of God. Some require, also, that there should be a corporeal and visible element, but this also equally seems to be unnecessary. And some restrict the grace which is conferred to justification and the remission of sins; however, this condition also is arbitrary.

The sacred rites, such as we here define, are seven in number: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Orders, Matrimony. In Baptism, the rite is ablution with water "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost the grace is the purification of the soul, the bestowing of faith and penance, and, consequently, the remission of sins and renovation. In Confirmation, the rite is unction: the effect of the grace conferred is indicated by the word Confirmation itself. In the Eucharist, the rite is the ministering of the symbols, according to the prescribed form: the grace is the nourishment of the soul, or the increase of charity. In Penance, the rite is confession and absolution: the grace, the remission of sins. In the Unction of the Sick, the rite is indicated by the name: the grace is the support of the vital powers in sickness, chiefly in order that, while life is in peril, the soul may be strengthened against temptations. In Orders, the rite is imposition of hands, and whatever else appertains thereto: the grace is the spiritual power conferred on the ordained, which consists in celebrating the perpetual Sacrifice, and in remitting and retaining sins. Lastly, in Matrimony, the rite is the legitimate declaration of consent: the grace is the Divine benediction, to which, as a kind of spiritual effect, is annexed the bond of Matrimony.

No rite has hitherto been discovered which could, even with any shew of reason, be added to these seven; except the “Washing of Feet,” which has been, by some, referred to the number. But, although the words of Scripture seem to favour it somewhat, this rite has not received the testimony of the Church; for if this condition had been added, it also should have been admitted as a Sacrament.

Some of the Sacraments are necessary to salvation, so that without receiving them, or a desire, express or virtual, of receiving them, no one can be saved; for one who contemns them, by the very fact, commits a mortal sin. Let us suppose that a person elicits an act of contrition; such a man will certainly obtain remission of sin without receiving the Sacrament, although he may not expressly think of going to a priest as soon as he can, and although, therefore, his desire of the Sacrament is only virtual: because obedience, and the will of doing all that God has ordered and instituted, are virtually contained in the act of the love of God. But, on the contrary, if a person, at the time when he is said to make an act of contrition, has not an intention, although he adverts to the necessity of confession, of going to a priest as soon as he shall be able, such a man has not really elicited an act of contrition. And, after the act of contrition is completed, if, when the thought of the priest presents itself, he does not form an intention of going to him, he falls into a new mortal sin, and loses the fruit of contrition.

The minister of a Sacrament is sometimes a Bishop, as in the Sacraments of Orders and Confirmation: sometimes a priest, as in the Sacraments of the Eucharist, Penance, and Extreme Unction: sometimes any one of the faithful, as in the Sacraments of Baptism and of Matrimony. And we must hold that, by the Divine law itself, these are constituted the ordinary ministers, insomuch that without them the act is null. In certain circumstances, however, it appears that the Divine law itself permits a departure from the ordinary minister, either at the dispensation of the Church, or from the very necessity of the case. For many things which appertain to Divine positive law admit of dispensation, and may be suspended by the disposition of the Church, or by other circumstances; as appears from the impediments of Matrimony, from the administration of the Eucharist under one kind, from the permission freely accorded in the Old Testament for divorce and polygamy, and other things of the same kind. And thus, not only was this distinction recognised among the ancients, but the Council of Trent also, in some cases, distinguishes between the ordinary and another minister. However, it is safest not to depart too easily from the ordinary minister.

In the ministers is required “an intention of doing what the Church does for, if it be certain that they act but in jest or mimicry, it would appear that, by such an act, they do not really baptise or absolve from sins. And thus, although the person baptising or absolving should be an Atheist, who believed that Baptism was of no effect, his intention of baptising may, notwithstanding, be serious, and this is sufficient. Were it actually to happen, however, that a bad priest should withhold the required intention, even in such a case, although there would be no Sacrament conferred, yet St. Thomas well suggests, that the Supreme Priest will supply its fruit, and St. Augustine favours this opinion in his book *On Baptism*. But the impiety of the minister is no obstacle to the valid celebration of the Sacrament, provided the other essentials be present.

However, it may also be defended, and not without probability, that if a person acts in such a manner that the act does not appear to others to be done in mimicry, he may be regarded as having an intention, or what is equivalent thereto; and therefore, that such a person, even though he internally resolve the contrary, would seem to have baptised, absolved, and consecrated validly; just as he who knowingly does all that has the effect of conveying to the external senses what is required for an oath,

appears, by the very fact, to have taken the oath; as otherwise, it will be in the power of a villain to secure himself from being a perjurer, and all oaths may in effect be eluded. In like manner, then, I think that it is more safe, that it is more in accordance with the Divine institutions, and consults better for the comfort of the weak, to lay down that it is not in the power of the minister to withdraw the will or intention of the mind by a mere internal protest, when that protest appears at variance with the fact. Nor do I think the words of the Council irreconcilable with this.

Some of the scholastics raise a number of discussions concerning the character, or the indelible sign which is impressed on the soul of those who receive the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation, or Orders. The question, however, presents no difficulty, if it be only considered that there is acquired, in receiving this Sacrament, a certain permanent quality, the reiteration of which is invalid and unlawful. Even in the civil law, we find examples of similar qualities. For no one can acquire what is already his own; or, in other words, a man who has entire dominion of a thing cannot further acquire dominion of it; and if — by virtue, perhaps, of some prohibitory law — he had no power whatever of alienating it, whether entirely or in part — as the right of the crown, and, in some countries, that of domain, is known to be inalienable — we should, in that case, have something which resembles the character, that is, which could not be validly reiterated. And since the act of administering the Sacrament — I mean, administering it a second time — is void or null, it is also, by the very fact, unlawful or prohibited; for knowingly to administer a Sacrament invalidly, is a sacrilege, or at least a grievous crime. Now, by Baptism, men are made Christians, by Confirmation they are attached to the Christian soldiery by a new and, as it were, a closer sacramental bond; by receiving Orders they become ministers of the Church. And these, unquestionably, are permanent qualities.

It remains that we explain our opinions regarding the efficacy of the Sacraments in the sense which divines describe by the phrase, *ex opere operato*. And in this question, as in that of the character, I find that the introduction of a new name on the part of the scholastics has laid open to cavil, and exposed to the suspicion of novelty, an opinion which, considered in itself, is plain and intelligible. For indeed, if the Sacraments availed only by the disposition of the recipient, and not by the efficacy of the rite, there would really be no special grace attached to these rites; they would be mere ceremonies, the observance of which, perhaps, is prescribed, and cannot be omitted without crime, but which possess no intrinsic efficacy; because (were it not for the prohibition) whatever good these rites contain, would, with equal certainty, be obtained without the performance of them, by virtue of the general promises which have been made to those who possess faith and charity. In the same way, therefore, as in the Roman law no obligation arose from verbal declarations, and no action could be founded upon a contract, unless a certain form of interrogation and answer were observed (insomuch that the efficacy of this rite might be said to consist *in opere operato*, and not *in opere operantis*), so also may the same be said of Baptism, the entire effect of which is not impressed, unless the essentials of the rite are observed. In order, however, to receive the grace of the Sacrament, the soul of the recipient must be well disposed, so as that no obstacle may be placed in the way; and thus a certain *opus operantis* (that is, a certain state of the recipient) is indispensable for the *opus operatum* (the efficacy of the rite.)

Let us now speak of the Sacraments in detail, and first of Baptism; — briefly, however, for the controversies agitated concerning it at the present day are neither very important nor numerous. It must be confessed, indeed, that, were the authority of the Church wanting, the practice of Infant Baptism could not be satisfactorily

maintained; for there is no precedent for it in Sacred Scriptures: for the Scriptures, besides baptism with water, appear also to require faith in the recipient; and to ascribe faith, as some do, to those who do not possess reason, appears to be excessively precarious and illusory, and to revolt all probability. For, as St. Augustine says in the letter to Dardanus, “If we were to waste words in proving that infants, who know not even human things, have a knowledge of things divine, I fear we should but insult our senses by trying to prove by language a fact in which the evidence of truth passes all the powers and office of language.” And hence it seems to me, that those who reject the authority of the Church cannot withstand the force of the arguments of the Anabaptists. In like manner, it cannot be satisfactorily proved from Scripture that Baptism administered by any Christian, even by a heretic, is valid; for the power of baptising seems to have been given solely to the Apostles, and those sent by them, and there is no allusion to any others. And we see that the members of the so-called Reformed Religion have a difficulty in permitting its exercise to any but those who are ministers of the Church. Now it would not be competent to us, it is true, to extend the institution of God further than He has himself signified; but, seeing that the Church, which, by virtue of the Scripture promises, is “*the pillar and ground of truth*,” has delivered God’s will to us, we may rest secure.

Concerning the Sacrament of Confirmation, the existence of which is by some called into question altogether, we find, besides the brief allusions in Sacred Scripture to the rite of imposition of hands, an Apostolic tradition, attested by Cornelius, Bishop of Rome, as cited in Eusebius, by Cyprian the Martyr, by the Council of Laodicea, by Basil, by Cyril of Jerusalem, and by many others of the ancients. The learned are of opinion that it was sometimes administered along with Baptism; nevertheless they were distinct Sacraments. For, after a sufficiently protracted discussion, the Church thought fit to define that Baptism might be administered by heretics and to heretics, but that Confirmation should be administered by a legitimate minister. It was determined, too, that Baptism should be administered to infants as soon as possible; whereas Confirmation might be deferred till the years of discretion. From which it appears, that Baptism, inasmuch as it lays the foundation, is of greater necessity; but that Confirmation crowns the work which Baptism commenced. And hence some of the ancients, alluding to the name of chrism or unguent, are of opinion that it is only on being anointed after Baptism, that a person, by receiving the gifts of the Holy Ghost, becomes fully entitled to the name of Christian, being, as it were, in the language of the Apostle, made a king and priest.

I come to the Sacrament of the Eucharist, upon which the greater weight of the controversy has turned. For there are some persons who, reasoning too freely in judging of the Divine mysteries, and perverting certain words of Chrysostom, Augustine, and others among the ancients, maintain that the Body and Blood of Christ are not really present in the Lord’s Supper, but are only represented or signified; because they are as far removed from us as heaven is from earth, and a thing which possesses the true nature of a body cannot be in more than one place simultaneously. Some, with greater liberality, appear to admit (though not without ambiguity) that we really receive the Body of Christ, but receive it through the medium of the mind, which is raised up to heaven by faith; and that, consequently, as faith alone is the instrument of receiving, the Sacrament is not received by the unworthy — a doctrine which seems entirely opposed to the words of the Apostle. However, this opinion, when its supporters are driven to an explanation, seems, in the end, simply to amount to this, that the mind flies up to heaven, to receive the Body of Christ, only in the same way as we are said to be, in thought, at Rome or Constantinople; for, if they

adopt any other explanation, they will be compelled to ascribe to our mind a power which they deny to Christ's Body, viz. that of being in heaven and on earth at the same time. We shall be more secure, however, in adhering closely to the words of the Saviour, who, "*when He had taken bread and wine, said, THIS IS MY BODY.*" Pious antiquity always recognised in this Sacrament a great mystery which was beyond the comprehension of the human mind; now, if it be a sign that is given instead of the reality, there is no mystery in it whatsoever. And indeed, that every existing Church in the entire world, with the exception of the Reformed Churches, and those which have sunk lower than the Reformers in innovation, admit the real presence of Christ's Body, certain recent writers of eminence have demonstrated with such overwhelming evidence, that we must either admit this to be proven, or abandon all hope that any thing shall ever be proved regarding the opinions of distant nations.

It is true, that if it could be proved by irresistible arguments involving a metaphysical necessity, that the whole essence of a body consists in extension, or the filling a determinate space, — in that case, as truth can never be opposed to truth, it would follow as a necessary consequence, that, even by Divine power, one body could no more be in many places simultaneously, than the diagonal can be commensurable with the side of a square. And if this were ascertained, it would, unquestionably, be necessary to recur to an allegorical interpretation of the Divine word, whether written or traditionary. But so far is it from being true, that any of the philosophers has perfected this vaunted demonstration, that, on the contrary, it rather appears capable of solid proof, that, though the nature of a body requires that it should be extended, unless an obstacle to its extension be interposed by God, nevertheless the essence of a body consists in matter and substantial form, that is, in the principle of action and passion; for it is the essence of a substance to be capable of acting and suffering. Matter, therefore, is the first passive power, and substantial form is the first act, or the first active power; and though it is true that the natural order of things requires these to be defined by a place of determinate magnitude, yet there is no absolute necessity which requires it.

There are some, who, while they admit the Real Presence, maintain, so to speak, a sort of impanation. They say that the Body of Christ is given in, with, and under the bread. Hence, when Christ said, "This is my Body," they understand it in the same sense as if a person were to exhibit a purse, and to say, "This is money." The records of pious antiquity, however, plainly enough demonstrate that the bread is changed into the Body, and the wine into the Blood of Christ: the ancients, too, universally acknowledged therein a change of substance (*μετασχηματισμον, μετουσιασμον*), which the Latins have aptly rendered 'Transubstantiation;' and it has been defined that the whole substance of the bread and wine is changed into the whole substance of the Body and Blood of Christ. And therefore, here as elsewhere, the Scripture is to be explained from the tradition which the Church, its keeper, has transmitted to us.

Oftentimes, however, as they are not distinguishable by the senses, the name of bread and wine is applied to the remaining species. Thus St. Ambrose declares the word of the Lord to be so efficacious, that "they at once are what they were, and are changed into another thing;" that is, the accidents are what they were, the substance is changed; — for the same Father says, that after consecration they are not to be believed any thing else "but the Body and Blood of Christ." And the Roman Pontiff Gelasius insinuates that "the bread is changed into the Body, while the nature of the bread remains," that is to say, its qualities or accidents; for in those times the forms of speech were not measured in strict accordance with metaphysical notions. And it was in this sense also that Theodoret said, that in this conversion, which he himself calls a

change (*μεταβολην*), “the mystic symbols are not divested of their proper nature.” These expressions may be worthy of notice, as bearing against those writers of the present day, who hold that even the accidents of the bread do not really remain, but only the appearance of them, or an empty and dream-like apparition.

Nor do the accidents of the symbols subsist in the Body of Christ as a subject; they are not sustained in any subject, and the mass itself (which certainly is different from the matter) seems, by the Divine power, to discharge the office of subject for the other accidents. And these principles are wisely laid down by theologians, in order to avoid any thing incongruous in the worship. For if the accidents which belonged to the bread could be predicated of Christ’s Body, it would follow that Christ’s Body was a fragile, round, slender, white thing; it would follow too, that this small, white, round thing — in a word, this thing which has all the sensible properties of bread — was the object of adoration, and that all the indignities which may be offered to the species, or may accidentally befall it, occur to the Body of Christ itself.

It is certain, moreover, that it was the doctrine of the ancients, as appears from the words of Ambrose just cited, that the conversion is wrought by the very act of consecration; nor did any of the ancients ever hear of the novel opinion held by some now-a-days, that the Body of Christ becomes present only in the moment of communion; for there are well-ascertained instances of persons not consuming this sacred food immediately on receiving it, but sending it to others, and carrying it to their houses, nay even upon journeys and into deserts; and this custom, though it was afterwards abolished for greater reverence, was at one time approved. And indeed, either we must hold (which Heaven forbid!) that the words of institution, as pronounced by the priest, are false, or we are compelled to admit that what is blessed by him is the Body of Christ, even before it is eaten. Not to speak of the difficulties in which the defenders of this opinion embarrass themselves, as to whether the conversion first commences on the lips, or in the mouth, or in the throat, or in the stomach; or, indeed, whether it take place even there, if, through any defect of the organs, the symbols are not consumed.

However, as there are, especially among the members of the Reformed Church, some eminent and acute-minded men, who, deeply imbued with the principles of a certain new and captivating philosophy, imagine, to use their own language, that they understand clearly and distinctly that the essence of a body consists in extension; that accidents are but modes of a substance; and therefore that they can no more subsist without a subject, or be separated from a substance, than uniformity of circumference can be separated from a circle; and as it is from this fancied evidence that their deplorable and almost insuperable aversion for the doctrines of the Catholic Church arises, I think that it is our duty to consult for their malady; and that Catholic philosophers should labour (as the Council of Lateran directed to be done against those who erred regarding the nature of the soul), not only to satisfy the objections clearly and lucidly, but even to establish accurately the contrary doctrine. For they loudly declare, that it is not in the power of any decree of the Church, of any law, in fine, of any authority whatever, to force an individual, even though he be ready to obey, to believe truly and sincerely a doctrine which is impossible, and which implies, or at least evidently appears to imply, a contradiction. And therefore they protest that the separation from the Church is not to be imputed to themselves, but to them who refuse to receive back those who are separated, save on a condition which to them is impossible.

Our brief limits, it is true, do not permit us to enter at much length into philosophical discussions; but it will be enough for us to observe, in passing, that we

too have applied, and that not merely in a perfunctory manner, to the study of mathematics, mechanics, and experimental philosophy; and though it must be confessed that in the beginning we inclined to the very opinions to which we have just alluded, yet we have been compelled, by the progress of study, to return to the principles of the old philosophy. And perhaps, were it permitted to explain the course of our researches, there is no one, except those who are pre-engaged by the prejudices of their imagination, who would not admit that these views are not of that confused and absurd character which is commonly attributed to them by those who despise the received doctrines, and who scoff at Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, and other illustrious men, as though they were but children in philosophy.

Certainly, if place is different from the thing placed, or space from a body, so also will matter be different from extension. Now in the case of the former, we are all led by a natural impulse to acknowledge the distinction; and in matter, over and above its dimensions, we conceive a something which the ancients called ἀντιτυπία (*resistance*), and which we may denominate ‘mass,’ from which thing it arises that bodies do not mutually compenetrates each other, as if they were empty; but, on the contrary, have the capacity of coming in collision, and of being mutually acted upon by one another; and from which it also arises that, in a body of greater mass, the impetus or force will be greater, though the velocity be the same; — effects which certainly cannot be derived from extension alone. It is also of the nature of a body to act continually by a kind of vibration, to repel other bodies, and to maintain its own place; though this action takes place in the minute particles, and cannot be observed in the greater; for I do not think there exists any substance which is devoid of all ordinary action. And it is from this internal motion that the greater or less connexion of the parts arises, according as their motions harmonise with one another and the external motions in a greater or less degree.

This resistance or mass, and this effort to act, or motive power, are distinct from matter, or the primary power of suffering or resisting, and from substantial form, or the primary power of acting, which others call the first act; because the secondary powers may be limited or increased, while the primary powers remain unchanged; for there is nothing to prevent God from being able to increase the mass or density of the matter without increasing its dimension; as when, for example, He increases the force, its velocity remaining the same. Thus we see that a blow struck by iron is greater than that of wood of the same dimension; and although, in these substances, the difference naturally arises from another cause, — namely, from there being interspersed in the wood a greater quantity of heterogeneous fluid, which is not moved simultaneously, in consequence of which the blow is not struck by all the matter comprised under the dimensions of the wood, — yet I do not see what there can be to prevent God from being able to cause the blow to be greater, though the matter and velocity really remain the same, and to make the bodies differ in specific mass or density, not merely in appearance, but also in reality. Now it certainly is clear that, even naturally, the effort of continuing motion, or the motive power, may be changed without affecting the substance of the body. Here, then, we have two absolute qualities, or real accidents — mass or power of resisting, and effort or power of acting; and these qualities certainly are not modes of a corporeal substance, but something absolute and real superadded to it; for, when they are changed, a real change takes place, while the substance remains. And, in general, either there must exist real or absolute accidents, which are distinguished from the substance by some other distinctions besides modal ones (as those which we call relations ordinarily are); or every real change must also

be essential or substantial — an alternative which will not be admitted even by those who deny the existence of real accidents.

The individual essence of a thing, therefore, or that “which causes it to be that thing, and to remain one and the same through manifold changes,” consists in a certain power, or actual faculty or capacity of action — and this a primitive one — which requires certain secondary powers and certain acts, but which may be divested of some of them by nature, and of them all by God, others being substituted in their stead. Now, if the essence of a thing consists in that property, in virtue of which it remains the same, though under different dimensions and qualities, and in consequence of which the essence is not divisible or variable along with its dimensions, or changeable along with its qualities, it follows that it is really distinct from them. Now, regularly speaking, things which are really distinct may be separated by the absolute power of God, and that in such a way as that either the one may subsist, the other being destroyed, or both may subsist, but separately. And indeed, Nature herself, without destroying the essence, takes away dimensions and qualities, and substitutes others in their stead; but there is nothing to prevent God from changing, or even completely intercepting or impeding, this natural substitution, so that the essence may remain, entirely divested of dimensions and qualities. He may also cause the same thing to have different dimensions and qualities simultaneously; or the same real accident to appertain to different substances; and lastly, He may sustain the dimensions and qualities, the thing or essence being entirely taken away. Nor is it possible to conceive any contradiction in these suppositions; for, if the real distinction be once admitted, the reason is the same for them all; and the existence of substance and of real accidents, and their union, are equally dependent on God’s will. And since the nature of things is nothing else than God’s ordinary mode of action, it is equally easy for Him to follow the ordinary mode, or to adopt an extraordinary one, according as his wisdom requires. On the contrary, to change modal accidents — those which result by a necessary or metaphysical consequence from real ones — involves a contradiction or an absurdity, and therefore cannot be attributed to God. Of this class are the modes which — as, for instance, relations — arise without any real change, merely from connexion; and therefore such accidents cannot be conceived without absolute subjects to sustain them.

Having explained the mystery of the Eucharist, as far as our powers of comprehension permit, and as far as appeared necessary for the purpose of removing contradictions, it remains for us to speak of the Eucharistic Communion; and in this matter, the first question that presents itself for consideration is one which is known to have occasioned great commotions — that of communion under one or both kinds. There is no doubt, indeed, that Christ instituted the consecration of the bread and wine together, and that He gave his Body and Blood to the Apostles under both species; Paul delivered the same usage to the Corinthians; and the primitive Church, as the Oriental Church does even still, continued to observe it, until by degrees — chiefly through a feeling of reverence, founded, not to speak of other reasons, on the greater liability of the liquid element to perish or to be destroyed — it was ordained, especially in the West, that the species of bread only should be given to the faithful when they communicate, and that the species of wine should be received only by the priest consecrating. This ordinance, however, was not made without the implied sanction of Sacred Scripture, nor was it without a precedent in the usage of the ancient Church. For there are many Fathers who interpret, as referring to the Eucharist, the supper of Emmaus, in which “*the breaking of bread*” alone is mentioned; and it was customary for Bishops who were in communion with each other, in testimony of

fraternal charity, to send one another, even so far as from Rome to Asia, the Eucharistic food, as a pledge of unity of faith and communion; not to speak of the practice of giving the sacred element into the hands of the communicants, to carry with them on journeys, or into the deserts, or to preserve for some other use. And when a practice was introduced, I suppose with the view of preserving both kinds, of taking the species of bread dipped in the wine, Julius, Bishop of Rome about the middle of the fourth century, censured this usage. That it was free, in the fifth century, for individuals to abstain from the chalice, and that many persons did abstain from it, appears from the fact that such was the uniform practice of the Manichees, who were mixed up and concealed among the rest of the faithful; and the Roman Pontiff Leo, with a view to their detection, commanded that both kinds should be received by communicants. In the same see, a short time afterwards, Gelasius repelled from his communion all those persons (a remnant, I suppose, of the Manichees) who received only the Sacred Body, and abstained, through some superstition, from the chalice of the hallowed Blood. In the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, the custom of dipping the bread began to come into use again, as Cassander shews from the Institutes of the monks of Clugny, from the Council of Tours, and from Yvo; but this arose from reverence, for the Institutes of Clugny allege the awkwardness of the novices as the reason. In some places, in order to prevent the danger of effusion, a sucking instrument was used, as may be proved by authorities; and some of these tubes are preserved even to this day. There were some places, however, in which the chalice was not given to the people; for St. Thomas testifies that such was the custom of some churches in his time. Cassander, to whom we have already referred, also cites Peter De la Palu and William of Mont le Dun, who testify that communion in both kinds was retained only in some churches, and that in these great caution was used; as also Richard Middleton, who attests that in his age the chalice was given only to the higher among the people, among whom the danger of spilling was less apprehended; as was also done in the time of Thomas Waldensis — a little before the Council of Constance — who tells us that this privilege was granted to kings, prelates, distinguished persons, and the elders among the people; and it is probable that this is the origin of the custom of giving both species to the kings of France, at least at their coronation. At last communion in one kind came universally into use; and in the acts of the Council of Constance, the procurators of the Synod demand that salutary measures be taken for the welfare of the Church, inasmuch as certain priests continue to give both species to the laity.

Nor, indeed, can it be denied, that by virtue of concomitance, as divines say, Christ is received entire under either kind, since his Body is not separated from his Blood. The only question is, whether we may, without sin, depart from the form which appears to be prescribed in Sacred Scripture. And I confess, that if this had been done by private individuals, it would be impossible to acquit them of the charge of grievous temerity; but the usage of the Church, continued for so many ages, proves that, even from the earliest times, it was believed to be allowable to dispense with the use of the chalice, for approved reasons. And there are some Protestants who admit that, if a person have a natural abhorrence of wine, he may be content with the communion of the bread alone. Now, I ask, what more pressing cause can there be than the desire of avoiding schism and of preserving the unity of the Church and public charity? I hold it to be certain, therefore, that the withdrawal of the chalice cannot supply any one with a just cause of seceding from the Church.

And what the rulers of the Church have done, they have done with a good intention and for a grave reason; for it is certain that, as a liquid is divisible into very minute

parts, portions of it may more easily be destroyed, being exposed to the various dangers of being spilled, or of adhering to other objects. And it is for this reason that the form of the bread also has been changed, and, instead of crumbling bread, from which fragments might easily fall off, a different kind has been substituted. But you will ask, why should men fear now-a-days, what neither Christ, nor the Apostles, nor the holy Fathers apprehended during so long a course of centuries? We must hold, in reply, that, as I have repeatedly said, offence and scandal depend in part on the opinions of men. Now it is certain that, of old, men were less shocked by such accidents than they would be at the present day. We are perfectly certain, it is true, that no indignity can occur to Christ and his most sacred Body; and that whatever befalls, reaches only the visible symbols. But now-a-days a much higher degree of outward reverence is shewn even to these elements; especially since the piety of the people has sanctioned the usage of rendering public honours to Christ under the symbols of his Body, — an observance which formerly was less practised; for it is certain that, in sacred rites and in divine worship, some things, which are not essential, vary with time.

Whether it would be better, however, at the present day, to restore the chalice to the people; that is, whether the reasons alleged by so many princes and nations do not outweigh these alleged inconveniences; — to define this, pertains not to private persons, but to the rulers of the Church, and especially to the Sovereign Pontiff, to whom the Council of Trent has left the regulation of this entire matter. Some centuries ago, indeed, several entire nations demanded, and in part obtained, the restoration of the use of the chalice; as the Bohemians, and the Catholic Greeks in the territory of the Venetians, nay, in the city of Rome itself. And every one knows the solicitations which were addressed to the Sovereign Pontiff and the Council of Trent by the ambassadors of the Emperor, of the King of France, and the Duke of Bavaria, all strictly Catholic princes, as also the concession which the Pope at last made to the prayers of the Emperor; on which Cassander may be consulted. And I should think that if, at the present day, it would be possible, by a similar indulgence, to bring back some nation, or to obtain some great advantage for the Church, it would not be difficult to induce the Pontiff to accede. Meanwhile, though it should happen that the rulers of the Church were perchance to fall into the error of excessive severity, this error would be at their own peril; nor would the crime be imputable to the subjects, whose duty it is to obey in all those things which fall within the legislative authority of their rulers, as it is the duty of the rulers to take care that they use their authority aright. Now, I have no doubt that those who are in authority have power to make laws in such matters as these; and that the faithful are bound rather to obey them, than to give rise to a schism, which St. Augustine shews to be almost the greatest of all evils. Indeed, the Church's power of defining is very extensive, even (though this is only in a certain way) in things which belong to positive Divine law; as appears from the transfer of the Sabbath to the Lord's day, the permission of "*blood and things strangled*," the canon of the sacred books, the abrogation of immersion in Baptism, and the impediments of matrimony; some of which Protestants themselves securely follow, solely on the authority of the Church, which they despise in other things.

The practice of adoring the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, though it was not equally in use in every age, has with laudable piety been established in the Church. In every thing appertaining to the external display of worship, the early Christians observed the utmost simplicity; nor indeed is it possible to censure them in this, for they burned within with true piety of soul. But by degrees, as they began to grow cool, it became necessary to employ external signs, and to institute solemn rites

which might serve to remind men of their duty, and to revive the ardour of devotion; especially where there was any great reason or occasion. Now it is difficult to supply to a Christian a greater occasion than is presented in this Divine Sacrament, wherein God Himself renders present to us the Body which He has assumed. For although He is equally present at all times and in all places, as well by his substance as by his aid, yet, as it is impossible for us, at all times and in all places, to direct our mind expressly to Him, and to render to Him perpetual signs of honour, prudence will point out the propriety, in ordering the details of Divine worship, of marking off certain times, places, causes, and occasions. And God Himself, in assuming a human body into the unity of his Person, has given us a peculiar and most signal occasion of adoring Him; for no one will doubt the justice and congruity of adoring God while He appears in the visible form of Christ; and the same must be admitted wherever it is certain that Christ is corporally present (for the Divinity is present in all places and times), even though it be after an invisible manner; now it is perfectly certain that this condition is fulfilled in the most holy Sacrament. Hence, if there be any case in which the practice of adoring may congruously be introduced, it is the case of this Sacrament. And thus it has been justly ordained that the highest solemnity of external Christian worship should be devoted to the Sacrament of the Eucharist; because the object proposed by our Saviour in its institution was to enkindle the love of God, which is the highest act of internal Christian worship, and to testify and nourish charity. For when our Lord, at the last supper, delivered the supreme commands of his last will, He wished that we should remember Him (like all who love and are beloved in turn), and that we should love one another as members of his one Body, whereof He has made us all partakers. And hence the Church has always employed the Eucharist as the test of unity; and has been careful not to admit to its mysteries, which may be regarded as the inmost recesses of Christianity, any except the proven and purified. To no others, indeed, was it permitted even to be present at the mysteries. It is certain, moreover, that the ancients also adored the Eucharist; and indeed Ambrose and Augustine expressly apply to the adoration of Christ's Body in the mysteries the words of the Psalm, "*Adore ye his footstool*"

And in the end, since the necessity has ceased for deferring to Pagan prejudices, either by concealing the mysteries, or by abstaining from certain external signs, which might offend the weak, or wear the semblance of Paganism, it has gradually come to pass that the most exquisite rites of our external worship have been devoted to this venerable Sacrament; — especially in the West, where there has not been any necessity to consult for the prejudices of the Saracens. Hence it has been ordained, not only that the people prostrate themselves at the elevation of the Sacrament after consecration, but also that when borne to the sick, or otherwise carried in procession, it shall be attended with every demonstration of honour; that from time to time, whether on occasions of a public necessity, or for some other cause, it shall be exposed for adoration; and that, as the pledge of God's presence upon earth, it shall be celebrated yearly by a special festival, with the utmost joy, and, as it were, triumph, of the Church. And indeed the wisdom of these usages is so manifest, that even the Lutherans adore in the moment of receiving the Eucharist, although they go no further, not believing the Body of Christ to be present sacramentally, except in the actual eating thereof: but this we have already shewn to be a novel and incongruous invention.

And when they condemn the institution of the Church, the things which they assail are, in reality, only abuses reprobated by the Church herself, or some unfounded imaginations of their own. For they charge Catholics with adoring the earthly

symbols; and although they admit that the substance of the bread, the absence of which the Church distinctly teaches, is expressly excluded from the object of adoration, they fear, nevertheless, that the species may be adored; and, in addition to this, they allege the uncertainty of the transubstantiation's taking place, either because they believe the doctrine itself to be ill-grounded, or because a bad or invalidly ordained minister may either withhold the intention of consecrating, or may omit the act of consecration altogether. Now, they should be aware that it is not to the species that the adoration is directed; for the whiteness, the taste, the figure, and the other accidents of the bread, do not subsist in the Body of Christ as a subject, nor can they be predicated of it. And therefore, as it is to Christ the adoration is directed, it does not by any means regard this small, round, thin, white thing which has the qualities of bread, much less the whiteness or roundness themselves. Nor, even although it should happen that, in point of fact, the consecration did not take place, would it therefore follow that any idolatry was committed; because nothing else is adored; or, in other words, Christ God is adored, whether his Body be present or not; and as no act of adoration rendered to Christ can be superfluous, it will not matter, even though it should occur that the occasion of adoring Him offered by the supposed presence of his Body should prove unfounded. Hence there is no need for the protest which some persons make, "If thou art Christ, I adore thee; if thou art not, I do not adore thee for, besides that some such qualification is understood of itself, and would be understood even though Christ appeared visibly, it should also be recollected that this white, small, and bread-like object, neither is Christ, nor is believed to be Christ, nor is made an object of adoration. And if it does occasionally occur that the people are not rightly instructed as to the true object of adoration in this Sacrament, there is no doubt that this is a subject of deep concern to the Church, and that she desires to use every means for its correction.

It remains for us to explain the Sacrifice of the Mass, which the Church has always taught to be contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. In every sacrifice there may be distinguished the person offering, the thing offered, and the cause of offering. In this Sacrament of the Altar, the person offering is the priest. The Chief Priest is Christ Himself, who not only offered Himself once on the cross, when He suffered thereon for us, but also perpetually exercises his priestly office, even to the consummation of time, and even now offers Himself for us to God the Father, through the ministry of the priest or presbyter. Hence it is that He is called in Scripture "*a Priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedec*;" for nothing appears to be clearer than that in him, when, according to the prophetic allegory of the Scripture, he is said to "*have offered bread and wine*," the Eucharistic Sacrifice is prefigured. The thing offered, or the Victim or Host, is Christ Himself, whose Body and Blood undergo immolation and oblation under the appearance of the symbols. Nor do I see what there is wanting here to the true character of a sacrifice. For what is there to prevent that which is present under the symbols from being offered to God, seeing that the species of bread and wine are fit matter for oblation; that the oblation of Melchisedec consisted therein; and that what is contained under them in the Eucharist is the most precious of all things, and the most worthy offering which can be presented to God? Coming to the aid of our poverty, therefore, by this admirable device of mercy, the Divine goodness has enabled us to present to God an offering which He cannot despise. And as He is infinite in Himself, and as nothing else can emanate from us which would bear any proportion to his infinite perfection, no offering could be found capable of appeasing God but one which should itself be of infinite perfection. And in this wondrous manner it comes to pass, that Christ, ever giving Himself back to us anew

in this Sacrament as often as the consecration is repeated, can always be offered anew to God, and thus represent and confirm the perpetual efficacy of his first oblation on the cross. Not that by this propitiatory Sacrifice, repeated for the remission of sins, any new efficacy is superadded to the efficacy of the passion; its virtue consists in the representation and application of that first bloody Sacrifice, which "*perfected all things once*;" and its fruit is the Divine grace which accrues to those who assist at this tremendous Sacrifice, and who worthily celebrate the oblation in unison with the priest. And hence, as besides the remission of eternal punishment, and the gift of Christ's merit unto the hope of eternal life, there are many other saving gifts which we may ask of God, both for ourselves and for others, whether they be living or dead — especially the mitigation of that paternal chastisement which remains due to every sin, even though the penitent has been received back into favour, — it evidently follows that, in the entire range of our worship, there is nothing more precious, or more efficacious in obtaining what we ask, than the Sacrifice of this divine Sacrament, in which the Body of the Lord itself is present. For, provided we come with clean heart to this altar, there is nothing which we can immolate more grateful to God, or of sweeter odour in his sight. And St Bernard well says: "All that I can give is this wretched body; and if that is too little, I add his own Body also." Now the Sacred Scripture itself, as we have already observed, clearly alludes to this sacrifice in the comparison of Christ with Melchisedec, in the hundred and tenth Psalm, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews; not to speak of *the perpetual Sacrifice* mentioned in Daniel and other places. And indeed, it was meet that the Christian religion should not be without a sacrifice; and that as our oblation, which was only prefigured by the sacrifices of the Old Testament, is the most perfect and most worthy of all sacrifices, it should also be permanent and perpetual, as it is insinuated in the Psalm cited above that the priestly office of our High Priest is perpetual. Indeed, this is the common interpretation of the ancients; and even the early Fathers, Justin Martyr and Irenæus, to say nothing of Augustine and the later ones, applied to the Eucharist the "clean oblation" of which Malachy speaks. Lastly, there are numberless passages of the holy Fathers in which it is declared that Christ is daily immolated in the Sacrament for the people. Thus Augustine calls it "an unbloody Sacrifice Cyril declares that we call "that which is consecrated the Body and Blood of Christ;" and Cyprian, that "in the supersubstantial bread there is both a holocaust and a medicine;" and other passages of similar import are every where to be met with.

When it is said that Masses are celebrated in honour of the Saints, this must not be understood in a cavilling spirit, but according to the mind of those who use the expression. For it is to God alone that the Sacrifice is offered, God's honour alone is principally sought; nor are the Saints honoured save as friends of God. It is true, at the same time, that, in honour of particular Saints, the Sacrifice is especially and peculiarly celebrated at the time and in the place where we commemorate the praises of the Saint, and implore his prayers and intercession, which derive all of dignity that they possess from Christ's merit and oblation. But it can no more be inferred from this, that the Divine Sacrifice is offered to the Saint on his festival, or at the altar, or in the basilica which bears his name, than it can be said that the divine office which is celebrated at an election or coronation is dedicated to the king, though it cannot be denied to form part of the honour which is paid him.

Moreover, as the dignity and utility of the perpetual Sacrifice are so great, the usage of offering it very frequently to God for the necessities of the faithful, even though it was not always accompanied by public communion, at last became universal. Of old, indeed, it was the usage that all who were present at the Sacrifice

should also partake of the communion; but, by degrees, the number of communicants was reduced to a few, when the fervour of early piety declined, and well-grounded fears began to be entertained, that too frequent communion and a promiscuous admission of communicants, might lead to a diminution of reverence, and be an occasion of sin to many. For if the faithful, in our own days, were all to approach the table of the Lord after the celebration of the mysteries, who can doubt that numbers of them would eat unworthily? On the contrary, by allowing intervals between the occasions of communion, time is given to those who come to the feast, to prepare, so that they may not be found without the nuptial garment. It would have been wrong, nevertheless, that, because communicants were not always found, the Divine honour should therefore suffer any diminution. Hence, when the laudable and pious practice of daily celebrating the most holy Sacrifice in every church was established, it followed as a consequence, that the communion of the priest who offered was regarded as sufficient. This is the origin of what they call Private Masses; and it is not right that the Church should be deprived of their fruit, which undoubtedly is very great, and that the honour of God should be curtailed by their suppression. For it is not a sufficient reason for requiring the abolition (which would cause the greatest offence to the faithful) of institutions which in themselves are excellent, to allege that the Church existed for a long time without them; neither are we to return entirely to the ancient simplicity in externals; save, perhaps, those among us who may prudently trust that they are able to offer within their hearts the pious fervour which distinguished the first Christians. And would that there were many who could entertain this confidence!

I need not enter at much length into the subject of the admixture of water, of leavened or unleavened bread, of the language in which the Divine office is celebrated, or of the sacred ceremonies which have been piously introduced. For it is certain that the Church has power of legislating on these matters, provided only that due decorum is observed, and that the people are supplied with means of knowing and understanding all that is said in a low voice and in the sacred language; and in these days there certainly can be no want in this respect, considering the number of books in the vernacular languages, containing a full explanation of the canon of the Mass, and of all that appertains to Divine worship, which have been published.

Having now explained the principal controversies which have been raised regarding the most holy Eucharist, we shall be able to discuss the remaining Sacraments with much less prolixity. Indeed, as regards the Sacrament of Penance, we have already, while treating of the remission of sins and of man's justification, adverted to most of the principles connected with it. For in an adult, when he is reconciled to God, penance is always necessary, whether this reconciliation take place at his first admission into the Church by initiation in the sacred laver, or at his second cleansing from the stains which he afterwards contracted, through the Sacrament of Absolution, to which the name of Penance has been peculiarly attached. And, assuredly, it is a great mercy on the part of God, that He has given to his Church that power of remitting and retaining sins, which she exercises through her priests, whose ministry cannot be despised without grievous sin. In this manner God at once confirms and strengthens the jurisdiction of the Church, and arms it against the refractory, by promising to give effect to her judgments; and hence, unhappily for schismatics, while they despise the authority of the Church, they are compelled also to forfeit her advantages.

Both kinds of remission, that which takes place in Baptism, and that which is received in Confession, are equally gratuitous, equally rest on faith in Christ, equally require penance in adults; but there is this difference between them; — that in the former nothing is specially prescribed by God beyond the rite of ablution, but in the latter it is commanded, that he who would be cleansed, shall shew himself to the priest, confess his sins, and afterwards, at the judgment of the priest, undergo a certain chastisement, which may serve as an admonition for the future. And as God has appointed priests to be the physicians of souls, He has ordained that the ills of the patient shall be exposed, and his conscience laid bare before them; — whence the wise declaration which the penitent Theodosius is recorded to have made to Ambrose: “’Tis thine to prescribe and compound the medicines, mine to receive them.” Now the “medicines” are the laws which the priest imposes on the penitent, as well to render him sensible of past sin, as to make him avoid it for the future; and they are called by the name of satisfaction, because, on the part of the penitent, this obedience and self-chastisement are grateful to God, and mitigate or remove the temporal punishment which should otherwise be expected at his hands. Nor can it be denied that this is an ordinance in every respect worthy of the divine wisdom; and if there be, in the Christian religion, anything admirable and deserving of praise, assuredly it is this institution, which won the admiration even of the people of China and Japan; for, by the necessity of confessing, many, especially those who are not yet hardened, are deterred from sin, and, to those who have actually fallen, it affords great consolation; insomuch that I regard a pious, grave, and prudent confessor as a great instrument of God for the salvation of souls; for his counsel assists us in governing our passions, in discovering our vices, in avoiding occasions of sin, in making restitution, in repairing injuries, in dissipating doubts, in overcoming despondency, and, in fine, in removing or mitigating all the ills of the soul. And if, in the ordinary concerns of life, there is scarce anything more precious than a faithful friend, what must it be to have a friend who is bound, even by the inviolable obligation of a Divine Sacrament, to hold faith with us and assist us in our need?

And although of old, while the fervour of piety was greater than it is now, public confession and penance were in use among Christians, nevertheless, in consideration of our weakness, it has pleased God to make known to the faithful, through the Church, the sufficiency of a private confession made to a priest; and on this communication the seal of silence is imposed, in order that the confession thus made to God may be placed more completely beyond the reach of human respect. And yet, although it is certain that changes have taken place as to the mode of confession at different times, it does not follow that confession, such as the Church has ordered and prescribed it, is on this account less to be regarded as an ordinance of divine law. For there are many things regarding the dispensation of his Sacraments which God has left to be defined and ordained by his Church; — not that the Church can directly cause a thing to be of Divine law, but that God Himself leaves dependent on the disposition of the Church some of the conditions and circumstances of those things which are of Divine law; as we have already explained by the example of the impediments of Matrimony. The same principles, therefore, may properly be applied to the form of that judiciary process which Christ, in granting the keys, has empowered the Church to exercise. For this, at least, is expressly of Divine law, that no one can obtain absolution who contemns the judgment of the Church, and dares to neglect the conditions which she either exacts in confessing, or imposes after confession.

Hence also the Sovereign Pontiff and the Bishops have a power of instituting “reserved cases,” which cannot be remitted by an ordinary priest except in danger of death; and of prescribing penitential canons; and of defining how far the enumeration of the particular circumstances of sins is necessary for the sufficiency of confession; and the culpable neglect of these laws on the part of the penitent would certainly invalidate the absolution, if it were only on account of the new mortal sin, and therefore impenitence, which is induced thereby.

There still remains this important question, whether, for the Sacrament of Penance, perfect contrition, or the love of God above all things, is necessary, or whether attrition is sufficient. It is admitted, indeed, by all, as we have already observed, that a person who elicits an act of this supreme love, or, at least, an act of contrition founded on a motive of divine love, in which act the desire of the Sacrament is contained either expressly or virtually, is absolved even before confession. Now it must also be admitted that the actual reception of the Sacrament should supply some greater facility to the faithful; and it is in this increased facility that the virtue of this Sacrament principally consists. Hence, all things considered, it appears that, even according to the view of the Council of Trent, it may be said most correctly, that although attrition — or that imperfect penitence which springs not from the pure love of God, but from the fear of punishment or the hope of eternal life, and such other motives — cannot, of itself, lead to justification; yet, that when the Sacrament supervenes, this very grace, that is, an infused ray of the grace of Divine charity, which is equivalent to contrition, and which by virtue of Christ’s merit effaces sin, follows in its train; so that the principle remains certain, that Divine love is essential for the justification of the penitent, whether it be obtained by the fervour of the penitent himself, excited and assisted by God, or by the peculiar virtue of the Sacrament.

The works of satisfaction for sin undertaken by individuals, whether by order of a priest or through voluntary piety, have a two-fold virtue; — one of healing the soul and protecting it against relapse; the other, of mitigating the Divine “chastisement which, from reasons of justice, is inflicted, either in this life or in the next. Of the latter we shall speak more fully under the head of Purgatory. And of these satisfactory works St. Gregory the Great wisely says, “Let him who is conscious of having done things unlawful, study to abstain from some lawful things, that he may thereby satisfy his Creator.” To this head also, from affinity of subject, may be referred those chastisements, mortifications of the flesh, and other useful exercises, or works attended with a degree of pain, which are undertaken, not for the expiation of past, but simply for the prevention of future sin, and for the amendment of the soul. Such works are not to be censured, but, on the contrary, are praiseworthy and commendable; for they produce great fruit, and it is clear from the testimony of Scripture that they are pleasing to God. Nor, indeed, was it without reason that the wise men of the ancient Hebrews said, that “we should draw a hedge or mound, as it were, around the law that is to say, that it is useful to abstain from lawful things, in order to remove ourselves the farther from the confines of things unlawful: and that every man will act wisely in becoming his own lawgiver, and prescribing for himself, as it were, certain forms and observances, or cautions, as ramparts for the defence of his innocence. However, we must avoid all pharisaical notions of sanctity, and place all our trust, not in our own works, but in the grace and mercy of the Lord. For whatever of good we have done was all the gift of the Lord, and a duty which we were bound to render; and however great our payment may be, it will always be

imperfect; for whatever remains to us still belongs to God. These observations may suffice upon the Sacrament of Penance.

It is not necessary, for the present, to dwell at much length upon the Unction of the Sick. It is established by the testimony of sacred Scripture, and by the interpretation of the Church, on which pious and Catholic minds will rely with security; nor do I see what there is in the usage, as it is received by the Church, which any one can censure. Though we grant that, of old, it was often accompanied by the gift of cure, and that the recurrence of this, as of other extraordinary favours, has become less frequent, now that the Church is established; yet we are not to believe that, even of old, the Unction was always attended by a cure. Even still, therefore, there remains at least that perpetual and unfailing efficacy of cure — the cure of the soul itself when duly disposed — to which the Apostle James further alludes in describing the use of this Sacrament, and which consists in the remission of sins and the confirmation of faith and virtue; — graces which are never needed more than amid the peril of life and the terrors of death, in order to repel the fiery darts of Satan which then assail us with their greatest violence.

The Sacrament of Orders, or of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, is that by which the ecclesiastical or spiritual office or power, distinguished into its several grades, is conferred on certain individuals, whose ministry God uses for the purpose of dispensing the grace of his Sacraments, and of instructing, ruling, and retaining others in the unity of faith and the obedience of charity, superadding thereto a certain power of jurisdiction, which is comprehended chiefly in the use of the keys. To the hierarchy of pastors of the Church belong, not only Priesthood and its preparatory grades, but also Episcopacy, and even the Primacy of the Sovereign Pontiff; all of which we must believe to be of Divine right. As priests are ordained by a Bishop, the Bishop, and especially that Bishop to whom the care of the entire Church is committed, has power to moderate and limit the office of the priest, so that in certain cases he is restrained from exercising the power of the keys, not alone lawfully, but even validly. Moreover, the Bishop, and especially the Bishop who is called (Ecumenical, and who represents the entire Church, has the power of excommunicating and depriving of the grace of the Sacraments, of binding and retaining sins, and of loosing and restoring again. For it is not merely that voluntary jurisdiction which belongs to a priest in the confessional that is contained under the power of the keys; but the Church, moreover, has power to proceed even against the unwilling; and he *“who does not hear the Church”* and does not, as far as is consistent with the salvation of his soul, keep her commandments, *“should be held as the heathen and the publican”* and as the sentence on earth is regularly confirmed by that of heaven, such a man draws on himself, at the peril of his own soul, the weight of ecclesiastical authority, to which God Himself lends that which is last and highest in all jurisdiction, execution.

In order, however, that the power of the hierarchy may be better understood, we must recollect that every state and commonwealth, and therefore the commonwealth of the Church, should be considered as a civil body, or one moral person. For there is this difference between an assembly of many and one body, — that an assembly, of itself, does not form a single person out of many individuals; whereas a body constitutes a person, to which person may belong various properties and rights, distinct from the rights of the individuals: whence it is that the right of a body or college is vested in one individual, while that of an assembly is necessarily in the hands of many. Now it is of the nature of a person, whether natural or moral, to have a will, in order that its wishes may be known. Hence, if the form of government is a

monarchy, the will of the monarch is the will of the state; but if it be a polycracy, we regard as the will of the state the will of some college or council, — whether this consist of a certain number of the citizens, or of them all, — ascertained either by the number of votes, or by certain other conditions.

Since, therefore, our merciful and sovereign God has established his Church on earth, as a sacred “*city placed upon a mountain*,” — his immaculate spouse and the interpreter of his will — and has so earnestly commended the universal maintenance of her unity in the bond of love, and has commanded that she should be heard by all who would not be esteemed “*as the heathens and the publicans*” it follows that He must have appointed some mode by which the will of the Church, the interpreter of the Divine will, could be known. What this mode is, was pointed out by the Apostles, who in the beginning represented the body of the Church. For at the Council which was held in Jerusalem, in explaining their opinion, they use the words, “*It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us*” Nor did this privilege of the assistance of the Holy Ghost cease in the Church with the death of the Apostles; it is to endure “*to the consummation of the world*,” and has been propagated throughout the whole body of the Church by the Bishops, as successors of the Apostles.

Now, as, from the impossibility of the Bishops frequently leaving the people over whom they are placed, it is not possible to hold a council continually or even frequently, while at the same time the person of the Church must always live and subsist, in order that its will may be ascertained, it was a necessary consequence, by the Divine law itself, insinuated in Christ’s most memorable words to Peter, (when He committed to him specially the keys of the kingdom of heaven, as well as when He thrice emphatically commanded him to “*feed his sheep*,”) and uniformly believed in the Church, that one among the Apostles, and the successor of this one among the Bishops, was invested with pre-eminent power; in order that by him, as the visible centre of unity, the body of the Church might be bound together; the common necessities be provided for; a council, if necessary, be convoked, and when convoked, directed; and that, in the interval between councils, provision might be made lest the commonwealth of the faithful sustain any injury. And as the ancients unanimously attest that the Apostle Peter governed the Church, suffered martyrdom, and appointed his successor, in the city of Rome, the capital of the world; and as no other Bishop has ever been recognised under this relation, we justly acknowledge the Bishop of Rome to be chief of all the rest. This at least, therefore, must be held as certain; that in all things which do not admit the delay necessary for the convocation of a general council, or which are not important enough to deserve a general council, the power of the chief of the Bishops, or Sovereign Pontiff, is, during the interval, the same as that of the whole Church; that he can excommunicate any individual, or restore him to communion; and that all the faithful owe him true obedience; and this obedience extends so far that, in the same way as an oath is to be kept in all things in which it can be done consistently with the salvation of the soul, so also we are to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, as the only visible Vicar of God upon earth, in all things which, after due self-examination, we think can be done without sin and with a safe conscience; insomuch that, in doubt, when all the other circumstances are the same, we must regard obedience as the more safe course; and this we are bound to do for the love of the unity of the Church, and with the intention of obeying God in the person of those whom He has sent. For we should submit to suffer any thing whatsoever, even with grievous personal sacrifice, rather than be separated from the communion of the Church, and give occasion to schism. However, we shall have to speak more fully hereafter upon the primacy and authority of the Roman Pontiff.

All this, however, is to be understood with reservation of the right of earthly powers, which Christ did not abolish; for though Christian princes owe obedience to the Church, no less than the very humblest of the faithful, yet, unless where the law of the realm appears to have provided and ordained otherwise, the ecclesiastical power should not be stretched so far as to arm subjects against their true lords; for the arms of the Church are tears and prayers. And the best and safest line of demarcation between the secular and ecclesiastical power is that drawn by the example of the primitive Church; — viz. that we are bound to obey God and his ministers in preference to the secular power; nevertheless, that we must not resist earthly powers, but that, should they command what is unlawful, we must submit to any amount of suffering rather than obey the command, provided this can be done without certain injury of the faith. At the same time I do not deny that Christian princes and nations are bound to bestow some, and indeed very great, care upon sacred things; but it must be in such a way as not to put their hand to the ark, or, like Osias, to take the censer, but to content themselves with assisting the Church in more effectually preserving her purity and unity, and in using the right which she herself possesses. If these principles be observed, empire will subsist and flourish within empire — the sacred empire within the earthly — without mixture or confusion. Nor can it be denied that this is a consideration intimately connected with the security of the prince and the loyalty of the subjects, which the discipline of the Christian religion has but served to confirm.

With regard to the distinction between the bishop and the priest, whether, and how far it arises from Divine law, there is but little uncertainty or obscurity in the Church; but Protestants are at variance not only with the Church, but with one another. The Episcopalians in England and Scotland, as we know, defend the prerogative of Divine privilege against the Presbyterians, by the authority of Scripture as well as that of the ancient Church. Indeed, Christ Himself instituted a distinction between the Apostles and the rest of the disciples; after his ascension into heaven, the common consent of Christians retained it, in conformity with the discipline of the Master, and the Church has always held that the Apostles constituted the bishops their successors. Hence Aerius was regarded as a heretic, because he confounded the office of bishop and priest. Jerome, however, appears somewhere to say, that the difference between bishop and priest is of ecclesiastical institution, “more from custom, than from the truth of the Lord’s disposition and in another place he writes, that “what the priest does, the bishop also does.” In another passage, however, he subjoins a limitation: “What is there,” says he, “that the bishop does, with the exception of ordination, which the priest also does not do?” Perhaps, therefore, Jerome may be explained to mean, that the authority or government of bishops, in the form in which it existed in his time, and in which it exists even at this day, has been received from the Church; but that the ordinary spiritual power, which consists chiefly in the right of ordaining, has, by the institution of Christ, been reserved to the bishops, as it was also reserved to the Apostles. For it is certain that, at a later period, the faculty of administering Confirmation was more easily granted to priests. Because, though we were to suppose that there is nothing expressly contained in Apostolic tradition regarding any power on the part of bishops to excommunicate priests, and to bind, even independently of the concurrence of other priests, those whom priests had loosed; yet, since at least the power of the Church over priests must be admitted to be of Divine right, it would be competent to her to exercise this power through the hands of the bishops; and perhaps it would be her duty to do so, for there does not appear any other fitting medium for its exercise. However, if we suppose that Jerome admitted certain degrees in Divine institution, and that, whenever he regarded the authority of the Church as necessary in

order to complete the Divine tradition, he called this by the name of human institution, it would be a liberty which might be pardoned in so great a man, but which is not lightly to be imitated; and it is more simple to say that the bishop and the priest are really distinguished in their functions by the ordinary Divine law. Some things which appertain to election and nomination, however, may be regulated by human authority, provided it be done in accordance with reason and the usage of the Church.

But though the Divine right, in ordinary cases, be held as certain, yet there are many who dispute as to what might be done in circumstances of extreme necessity. They suppose the case of a Christian, whether he be a simple priest or even a mere layman, being cast by tempest on the shore of a remote island, and converting numbers to Christ, but destitute of all means of communicating with the rest of the Christian world. A question arises, whether this priest can ordain other priests, in order that, upon his death, the new Christians may not be deprived of the benefit of the Sacraments, which are very necessary for salvation. And indeed it is related of Frumentius, that during his mission among the Ethiopians, while he was still a layman, and before he received episcopal ordination, he did some things which were only excused by the necessity. Let it be supposed, then, that the apostle of this nation has not even been ordained a priest, the question is, whether, through the prayers of the new Church to God, he may promise, from on high, for himself and others, the grace of priesthood, and of the Sacraments connected therewith. For it is probable that some of the ancients were of opinion that, in a case of necessity, any Christian whatever had power not only to baptise, but even to sacrifice, as a passage of Tertullian seems to imply. For my part, however, I do not think it either necessary or safe to define these questions by private authority. It is better to leave the supreme care of the Church, and of the souls of the people, to God, whose mercy, confined by no limits, will always do what, under all the circumstances, is best to be done. The safest course, however, is not to depart from the line of ordination, which, through the successors of the Apostles, has carried down the grace of the ministry to us, by uninterrupted propagation.

Last of all, remains the Sacrament of Matrimony, which Christ, the best interpreter of the Divine law, has explained to be, as well by its primitive institution as by the destination both of God and of the contracting parties, the inseparable union of one man and one woman. It is true, nevertheless, that in the Old Testament, polygamy, or the privilege of one man's having more than one wife at the same time, was permitted by Divine dispensation; as was also the power of divorce, entitling married persons to separate and contract a new marriage: but Christ admonished us that this indulgence was granted only because of "*the hardness of men's hearts*," and therefore that its abolition is more in accordance with the Divine law. With justice, therefore, has polygamy, which it is no longer possible to excuse on the plea of necessity, been abolished in the Church. But what are we to say of the case of infidel nations, which it might be possible to convert to Christ by the toleration of a long-established usage of polygamy, and among whom it appeared that the refusal of this indulgence was the only impediment in the way of so great a good? For myself, the safer course appears to be to leave this matter to the decision of the Sovereign Pontiff. This, however, I may venture to pronounce, that should the Pontiff deem it expedient to permit the practice of polygamy to the Chinese nation, if it were true that they could be brought to the faith by this means (and it is certain that the Christian law of marriage, which is at variance with the oldest institutions of this people, is regarded by them as one of the chief impediments to Christianity), he would not, in so doing, contravene in any respect the doctrine of Christ. For, as it would be vain to look now for a new

revelation, it is fit that he should consult, in the name of God, for the salvation of nations. Hence, considering the precedent of the Divine example, and taking into account the nature of the human heart, I do not think that he would err in tolerating, for the sake of so great a good, an imperfection which God did not regard as intolerable in the Saints themselves; since it is certain that, in this matter, Christ did not so much enact a new law, as propose the true interpretation of the old one.

Difficulties more frequently arise among Christians on the subject of divorce. For oftentimes the parties are necessitated to separate from each other on account of adultery, or other serious causes; and as it is difficult to make them remain continent, it may be asked whether, in order to avoid a greater evil, the Church can permit a new marriage. Some, considering human weakness, and that “it is better to marry than to be burnt” are more disposed to be indulgent, fearing lest men, if too strictly prohibited the use of marriage, should perhaps peril their eternal salvation. Others admit at least two causes of divorce, properly so called, viz. adultery and desertion; especially as the words of Christ appear to favour it in the case of adultery. But the majority hold that it is not possible to recognise, as sufficiently approved by the Divine law, any ground for dissolving the tie of a marriage which has been ratified and consummated by cohabitation, in such a way that the parties may have full liberty, without any fear of censure, to enter into a new marriage. And the weight of authority at the present day is in favour of this opinion. The opinions of pious antiquity, however, are not uniform as to the amount of indulgence in the observance of his precepts, which God has reserved to Himself and to his Church. For we know that divorce was permitted by the laws of Christian emperors, even by the excellent emperor Theodosius the Great, and others. And yet it is clear from the Council of Milevis, that the Bishops sometimes desired that it should be prohibited by an imperial law. Nevertheless, the Church herself, through fear of incontinence, oftentimes relaxed to some extent in this matter. To pass over the Councils of Elvira, Tribur, and others, which are cited by Gratian, even the great Saint Ambrose says, “It is lawful for a man, if he have divorced a guilty wife, to marry another;” and the decisions of the Roman Pontiffs, Zachary and Gregory, are well known.

The rigid opinion of Augustine, however, which leaned to the more correct and better view, at last prevailed; and the doctrine which had been already expressed in the Council of Milevis, and enforced by the practice of the Church, was confirmed by the Council of Trent, which even retained some of the words. Its canon runs thus: “If any one shall say that the Church errs, when she taught and teaches (according to the evangelical and apostolic doctrine) that the bond of marriage cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of either of the parties; let him be anathema.” In this decree, however, the Council used a modification, in order not to condemn those who held the opposite opinion, which is held by several great men, but those only who said that the Church erred therein, and whose pertinacity is deservedly visited with anathema. I do not think, however, that this is to be understood to mean that the Church, which, if very great reasons arose, might tolerate even polygamy, cannot tolerate divorce: but the meaning of the decree is, that, according to the express doctrine of Christ, divorce, no less than polygamy, is contrary to the end of the primitive Divine law, which unites but two into one flesh, and forbids that “*what God hath joined, man should put asunder;*” in such a way, however, that, as Christ Himself testifies, on account of man’s hardness of heart or infirmity, a dispensation, in imitation of the Divine example, may be granted for a grave reason, or in a case of necessity; — in the same way as a dispensation may be given in a vow. For, seeing that God has granted much greater things to the Church of Christ, it is not to be supposed that, in this matter, He

has denied her any power which is useful or necessary for the salvation of souls, or that He has left her less authority than He granted to the ancients before the coming of Christ; — though He wished that the Church of the New Testament should use this authority of hers with greater caution, and that she should employ all her efforts to recall the faithful from pharisaical observances of the letter and from external justice, to greater purity both of the interior and exterior man, and to the true sense of the Divine law as it has been explained by Himself, not alone on the nature of marriage, but also upon other points. For the faithful should bear in mind that, if they wish to lead a life worthy of Christian holiness, they must, as far as possible, abstain even from certain things which are tolerable in themselves.

In all these things, therefore, it is better to follow the judgment of the Church, and to recognise her power, — a power which is also clear as regards the impediments of matrimony. Hence if the Sovereign Pontiff had granted liberty of divorce to Henry VIII. king of England, and had sanctioned his contracting a new marriage with Anne, even though it were certain that the first marriage with Catherine had been valid by his predecessor's dispensation; and if, by this compliance, he had preserved Henry's kingdom to the Church; or if the Pope were now to receive the Chinese empire into the faith, by permitting them to retain the usage of polygamy, which, in so vast a nation, it would be impossible to abolish suddenly without the greatest revolutions; or even if the Pope, for a great cause, grants a dispensation in the degrees which, regularly speaking, are prohibited by the law of God and of the Church; — in none of these cases do I think his power of dispensing can be denied, or his prudence censured, without rashness. For although Protestants question the power of the Church in the interpretation of the Divine law, and the dispensation of the Sacraments; and though they especially contend, that marriages in all those degrees which are forbidden in the eighteenth and twentieth chapters of Leviticus, and the twenty-seventh of Deuteronomy, are contrary to a Divine law which does not admit of dispensation, because God pronounces that He punishes the Gentiles for these incestuous connexions; nevertheless, as God has Himself shewn that some of these degrees, or equivalent ones, admit a dispensation (as when He even commands the same woman to be married to two brothers successively, not to speak of his permitting Jacob to marry two sisters at the same time), the Church has, with reason, decided that, at the present day, all the degrees except the first may admit a dispensation where there is a sufficient cause; and the greatness of this cause it is left to the conscience of the rulers of the Church, and of those who seek the dispensation, to determine. The Church can also institute new impediments which invalidate the marriage-contract — a power which the secular authority also claims in some countries; whence, by a law enacted in France, the marriages of children, if contracted against their parents' will, are regarded as null by the law itself; because the legitimate consent of the contracting parties is the "as-if-matter" of the Sacrament; and it seems to rest with the civil law to determine what shall be a legitimate consent. However, there is no evidence that the consent of parents is required by Divine law for the validity of marriage, though it cannot be disregarded without a grievous sin.

But although marriage is a Sacrament, and although we are bound to consider it as irreprehensible, yet the manifest reasons alleged in favour of celibacy, the consent of nations, and the express words of sacred Scripture, compel us to admit that celibacy, when chastely observed, is more meritorious. For by the observance of celibacy, the mind is at once more free for the contemplation of the things of heaven, and, from the chastity both of soul and body, and their exemption from lust and carnal affection, the offices of religion are performed with greater purity and worthiness. The Church

therefore, especially in the West, gradually tended towards, and eventually attained, the establishment of priestly celibacy. The Eastern Church has been more indulgent in this particular. Even in the West, indeed, the matter has involved great difficulty, especially as there are many who shew by their conduct that they really possess not the gift of continence; and hence arose innumerable complaints, partly from the clergy themselves, and partly from the people. And several pious Catholic princes earnestly pressed upon the Sovereign Pontiff and the Council of Trent the expediency of permitting the marriage of priests. Hitherto, however, there have been reasons of great moment which have prevented the desire of indulging from taking effect: and these reasons must be left to Divine Providence, who, sooner than we suppose, can point out more efficacious ways and means for restoring the peace of the Church, and removing the cause of complaint. Meanwhile it is fair that Protestants should consider how many things there are, even in human affairs, which we are compelled to endure, and to which no immediate remedy can be applied; nor are the rulers of the Church to be accused, because of the wickedness of men or the difficulty of the times. And for the clergy and religious themselves, they should be assured that, in order to the preservation of chastity, scarce any thing else, ordinarily speaking, is necessary but to avoid idleness and evil occasions, and to desire it seriously themselves — a grace which God refuses to no one who asks it devoutly.

Regarding vows of continence, poverty, or obedience, the same is to be said, viz. — that, for the observance of the promise made to God, a good intention alone is required; and therefore the vow of religion cannot be violated without a most grievous sin. The Church, nevertheless, where important reasons intervene, has full power to dispense, or remit, or commute the obligation, in the name of God Himself. However, as the human mind is liable to many infirmities, there is need of the utmost prudence in governing on the part of superiors in religious communities, and of great charity on that of the brethren, in order that discontents may be checked by grateful remedies, and temptations dispelled by pious and agreeable occupations. And as it frequently happens that abuses creep in through the negligence of those to whom this duty belongs; that simple, immature, inexperienced persons are entrapped, through error and fraud, without a Divine vocation; that the superiors are wayward, negligent, proud; the brethren unyielding, harsh, morose, envious, ambitious; and both, sometimes, dissolute, corrupt, and disedifying; it is not strange that, even in religious communities, where they had reason to hope for peace of spirit, so many souls should be involved in the greatest anxieties and miseries, often deprived of consolation, and the very instruments of salvation turned to their perdition — the most miserable fate which it is possible to conceive. It is our duty, therefore, to pray that God may grant good and prudent rulers to his Church, and may preserve long, and strengthen with virtue from on high, those whom He has granted to her, worthy of their office and trust; as well, that they may know the evils under which the Church most labours, and the remedies which are most required, as that they may have strength and firmness to overcome the obstacles which are thrown in the way of reform by the licentiousness and corruption of the carnal, or the imprudence of the indiscreetly zealous. At the same time, the position which we have already laid down on a former occasion remains undeniable, that if the forces of what may be called the army of the Church be duly marshalled — if the duties, cares, and occupations of clerics and religious be defined, and the laws of their institutes be observed, it is not easy to imagine any thing more beautiful, any thing more excellent, any thing, in fine, more conducive to the Divine glory, the profit of souls, and the exercise of charity.

Having now completed the explanation of the duties of Christians, of the Divine worship, and of the Sacraments, it remains for us briefly to advert to the Last Things, or the future life. Some persons (especially among Antitrinitarians) entertain this most objectionable opinion, that the human soul, of its own nature, is mortal, that it subsists only through grace, and that, after man's death, it sleeps, devoid of all perception and thought, to be resuscitated only on the day of judgment. But true philosophy, as well as revelation, demonstrates the contrary. For our soul is a substance: now no substance can entirely perish, except by a miracle of annihilation; and as the soul has no parts, it is not possible that it should be dissolved into several separate substances; therefore the soul is naturally immortal. Besides, the soul always actually thinks; for it must be held as certain that there is no substance in nature which, even for one moment, is entirely inactive, and devoid either of action or of passion. Now every action and passion of the soul involves thought. The only property which comes from the peculiar ordination of God, and belongs to the economy of his supreme Providence, is, that the soul, in its separated state, retains a memory and consciousness of the events of the past life, so as to be capable of reward and punishment. But very little, however, can be positively asserted regarding the place, the nature, and the functions, of souls when separate from the body, beyond what God has revealed to us through the sacred Scripture or his Church.

The soul, when, at its parting from the body, it is in a state of mortal sin, and thus ill affected towards God, falls headlong into the gulf of perdition, as if of its own accord, like a weight which has once been detached, and is not afterwards arrested or stayed by an external cause; and being thus alienated from God, it becomes, as we have already observed, the instrument of its own damnation. Insomuch that there are some pious men who believe the hatred of the damned for God to be so intense, that they voluntarily decline to throw themselves upon his mercy, and thus, by their own acts, induce, or prolong, their own eternal misery. And hence we should the less wonder at the severity of the just Judge; nor is there any necessity to recur to the merciful theory devised by Origen, who, affixing his own capricious interpretation to that mysterious passage of Paul, in which it is said that "*all Israel should be saved*," extends the Divine mercy eventually to every creature. Nor can it be denied that there were other holy men not entirely averse to this opinion, especially Gregory of Nyssa. Jerome himself, even when he is, as it were, forced to contradict it, speaks very moderately, and inclines to it at least so far as to say that "the works of the wicked (he is speaking only of Christians, however,) will be proven and purged by fire, the judge's sentence being tempered with clemency;" as if he thought that at least no Christian could perish eternally. But, in men so eminent as these, we must either pardon such opinions, or put a favourable interpretation on them.

But, on the other hand, it is manifest from sacred Scripture, that eternal happiness, which consists chiefly in the enjoyment of the Divine beauty, awaits all who die in the friendship of God. I know that there are some heterodox writers who call in question the beatific vision of God; but their doubts have no foundation; for even in the present state, God is the light of our soul, and the only immediate external object of our intellect; in the present state, however, we see all things as "in a glass, the ray of thought being, as it were, reflected or refracted by corporeal qualities; whence our thoughts are confused. But in heaven, where our knowledge will be distinct, we shall drink of the fountain of light, and shall see God "face to face." For, as God is the ultimate reason of all things, it follows, as a consequence, that when our knowledge will be *à priori*, through the cause of causes, we shall certainly see God; inasmuch as

our demonstrations will then require neither hypotheses nor experiments, and we shall be able to give reasons, even to the primitive truths themselves.

Many have found a difficulty in the question whether souls arrive at eternal happiness, or even eternal misery, before the day of judgment. Not to speak of more ancient writers, it is known that Pope John XXII. inclined to the negative. And indeed, were it admitted that they do, it might seem that the judgment, the form of which is described by Christ, would be superfluous; nor would it be possible for those who are to be damned to allege any thing in self-justification, if the whole matter were already concluded beyond hope of reversal. However, it is plain, from the very nature of the parable, that Christ there expressed his meaning according to human ideas [*ανθρωπολογικως*], and that on that last day, when the bodies shall be reunited to the souls, each one's conscience will speak, as well for the accuser and Judge as for the culprit. I confess, however, that in order definitively to determine this and many other similar questions, it is necessary to assume, in addition to the passages of Scripture, that interpretation which is more in accordance with the tradition of the Church.

I cannot venture to impugn the doctrine of a Limbo of Infants, or a place where souls suffer a pain of loss alone, but not a pain of sense; for it is maintained commonly in the Church, by men of the highest piety and learning, and appears to be sufficiently consonant with the divine justice. Nor can I commend those who, because they themselves know nothing but extremes, imagine that it is so also with God.

There are some who regard the Resurrection of the Body as among the most difficult articles of the Christian faith; and certain cases have been imagined which it is thought impossible to explain upon this supposition. Suppose the case of a cannibal who has lived on human flesh all his life; what, it is asked, will remain to him, when, like the flock of birds to the jackdaw in the fable, the victims shall come to him to claim their feathers; that is, when each one's flesh will return to its first owner? In order to understand this, however, we must be aware that it is false to say that every thing which was ever united to a man's body belongs to its essence; for it is certain that our body is constantly in a state of change, constantly receiving and losing particles, and that, were all the particles that ever belonged to us to be restored, we should be swelled to a thousandfold our actual bulk, and far more. It might be said, therefore, that, in every man there is, so to speak, a certain "flower of substance," the nature of which may be illustrated from the principles of chemists; that this is preserved throughout these numerous changes; and that, although it is contracted in infants, and in adults is expanded by the greater mass of assumed and variable matter which is put on, yet it always subsists, such as it was assigned to each at his birth, neither increased by aliments nor decreased by transpiration; and even though it be granted that this too is dissipated, yet as its value consists in its efficacy, and, as it were, its seminal virtue, and not in its bulk, it may be restored to each individual without loss to the rest. The cannibal, in the case supposed, therefore, will retain his own only, as will those also whom he devoured, without any confusion of the things which God assigned peculiar to each, which are diffused through the entire mass of the body, and remain distinct from what is superadded and held in constant fluctuation. The case might be solved, too, even without any such hypothesis, if we understand the cannibal who lived on human flesh alone to retain as his own some portion of each of his victims, without any detriment to them; for we have sufficiently refuted the supposition that every thing which at any time belonged to a man's body is restored to him in the resurrection.

Let us dismiss these inquiries, however, and come to the much-agitated question of Purgatory, or temporal punishment after this life. Protestants hold that the souls of the departed are consigned at once either to eternal happiness, or eternal misery. Hence they reject prayers for the dead as superfluous, or reduce them to the condition of idle wishes, such as, rather through human custom than any idea of their utility, we conceive regarding things already past and decided. On the contrary, it is a most ancient belief of the Church, that prayers are to be offered for the dead; that the dead are assisted thereby; and that, although those who have departed from this life may, through the merits of Christ, have been received into favour by God, and, by the remission of the eternal punishment, have been made heirs of eternal life, they continue, notwithstanding, to suffer a certain paternal chastisement or purgation, especially if they have not sufficiently washed out the stain during life. And to this purgatorial punishment some have applied Christ's words about "*paying the last farthing*" and that "*all flesh shall be salted with fire*;" others the passage of Paul, regarding those "*who have built upon the foundation, wood, hay, stubble*," and "*shall be saved, yet so as by fire*;" others, the passage on "*baptism for the dead*" It is true that the holy Fathers differ as to the mode of purgation. For some were of opinion that the souls are detained for a determinate time (which some extended to the day of judgment, and some even further,) in a certain place, where they undergo a temporary purification. Some held that the mode of chastisement consisted in corporeal fire; some, in the fire of tribulation — an opinion to which Saint Augustine at one time leaned, and which some Greeks hold even at this day. Some thought the purifying fire was the same, others that it was distinct from the fire of hell. And there were even some who restricted purgatory peculiarly to the time of the resurrection, wherein all, even the Saints, shall have to pass through fire; but those only shall be burnt, or shall suffer loss, whose work is so ill executed as to be liable to injury by fire. However this may be, almost all agreed as to the existence — whatever might be its nature — of a paternal chastisement or purgation after this life, to which the soul, enlightened at its parting from the body, and touched with extreme sorrow for the imperfection of its past life, and for the hideousness of sin, of which it then for the first time becomes fully sensible, voluntarily subjects itself, insomuch that it would not desire to attain to supreme happiness on any other condition. For many writers have well observed, that this affliction of the soul when it reviews its actions is a voluntary purgatory; and, among others, there is a remarkable passage of Lewis of Granada, which afforded great consolation to Philip II. in his last sickness.

APPENDIX.



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